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Net/Work: Composing the Posthuman Self
Julia L. Mason
ABSTRACT
The overall question this dissertation asks is: what does it mean to teach
posthumans? To answer this question, this dissertation turns toward scholarship
on the body in order to understand the virtual and material presence that students
develop, it looks to online video gaming communities as alternative classrooms
providing effective models of learning, and it investigates the circulation of service
learning pedagogies within academic institutions as a marker of the persistence of
humanistic values within the framework of a posthuman work environment.
The American university in general, and the humanities specifically, is
struggling to make sense of its place in a culture shaped by fast capitalism,
oppositional politics, boutique multiculturalism, social hierarchies, free markets,
technological revolution, international conflict, and a host of other phenomena that
challenge the university as a site of traditional humanistic inquiry. At the same
time, these forces highlight the university’s more modern roles in the knowledge
economy as a credentialing service, gatekeeper, and commercial incubator. Such
conditions represent yet another crisis of humanism. The contemporary
posthuman world to which universities are beholden is characterized by
transgressed boundaries, flexible identities, radical transparency, ubiquitous
iii

technology, networked subjectivity, and a loss of confidence in the universal
narratives and notions of essential humanity that provided impetus to Western
thinking for millennia. Colleges are struggling, whether they know it or not, to exist
in, and prepare students for, this posthuman world.
Perhaps the greatest promise of a responsible posthuman education is the
potential to produce citizens who are critically technologically literate and able to
rethink their relation to political systems, to the environment, to economies, to
technologies, to work, and to leisure, without totally abandoning the humanistic
values attendant to a liberal education. Part of this education must include
enabling students to see social systems as technologies which can be adopted in
order to produce different modes of being. Only then can the productive tension
between humanism and posthumanism become a part of higher education.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Ecce Post-Homo
Instead of the standard “Man of the Year,” the phrase “Machine of the
Year” graced the 1982 cover of Time magazine, with the accompanying line, “the
computer moves in.”1 This cover art depicts two figures—a man on the left and a
machine on the right—each taking up similar space on the page. The machine,
while hardly futuristic looking, appears more modern when contrasted with the
simple red desk atop which the machine sits. The screen is bright blue, with two
small bolts of yellow jutting downward on the screen. It’s difficult for a viewer to
determine what (if anything) is being displayed on it. On the left half of the cover
is a man, of perhaps forty or fifty years and balding, seated and gazing at the
computer’s screen. We can’t see much of his face, since he is turned toward the
machine. His arms and hands rest limply in his lap and his whole body is washed
in a grey-blue color that makes him look more like a stone sculpture than a living
human. He is motionless. Man and machine are separate here, and the man
stares blankly at the screen, perhaps in amazement. This image suggests that
man and machine are different, separate, and perhaps even distant. The human
and the inhuman meet but do not incorporate.
With the exception of 1988, when earth was named “Planet of the Year,”
each year between 1983 and 2006, Time selected a man, woman, or group to
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adorn their annual cover. In 2007, however, man and machine appeared on the
cover once again. The 2007 “Person of the Year” was “you.” In a use of
magazine cover technology that was critiqued as silly and crude, the editors
placed a semi-reflective mirror-like rectangle on the cover. The reader sees
herself, and thus, “You”, are 2007’s person of the year. On seeing the cover, or
perhaps, seeing her own image on the cover, she may almost miss the means by
which “you” are reflected. Around the mirror material you can barely see the edge
of a slim computer screen. Human and machine are no longer distinct; they are
one. This is the posthuman moment.
The melding of man and machine is a popular, if simplistic, marker of the
posthuman. It is a powerful image. Feminist scholar Donna Haraway uses the
figure of the cyborg, a man/machine blend, as a means to examine feminism,
politics, and technology. Haraway’s notion of the cyborg is, in part, a criticism of
what might be called the traditional feminism of the late twentieth century. She
considers this feminism limited by the very binary subject positions it seeks to
undermine. In a sense, adopting the vocabulary of binaries only serves to
reinforce their existence and their power. In her 1991 article, A Cyborg
Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth
Century, Haraway employs the cyborg as a metaphor through which to explore
the implications of feminism and feminist theory beyond binaries and beyond
boundaries.
Through this cyborg metaphor, Haraway argues for the rejection of identity
politics in favor of affinity politics, which in Haraways view, is a more useful
2

political/ideological position from which to advance the aims of feminism. The
cyborg, a melding of human and machine into a cybernetic organism, is a
thorough mixing of all those elements that we might consider opposed, for
instance, male/female, mind/body, and human/machine. These mixes are so
inextricably blended that they cannot be separated and perhaps, cannot be
distinguished.
To some, it is frightening to realize that humans and machines might be
linked so strongly that they cannot be separated. In some cases, their parts are
so indistinguishable that it is impossible to identify what is natural and what is
artificial. It is perhaps this fear that has driven individuals to try to understand the
implications of this aspect of posthumanism. Popular films such as Terminator,
as well as sci-fi classics such as the 1956 film Invasion of the Body Snatchers,
examine what happens when the wholeness and “purity” of the natural human
body is threatened, and in effect, attempt to reconcile the effects of
posthumanism. Posthumanism represented in popular culture allows us to see
that the “crisis in humanism is everywhere. Neil Badmington, cultural critic and
theorist, notes that “the reign of Man is simultaneously being called into question
by literature, politics, cinema, anthropology, feminism, and technology” (9). Thus,
both the autonomy and supremacy of man is being questioned in nearly every
aspect of modern existence.
In the years since the popularization of the personal computer in Western
cultures, we see an increasing number of articles, books, video games, and
movies each depicting and interpreting various meanings of posthumanism to
3

individuals, communities, and larger cultures. Newspaper, internet, academic
articles, and longer works that discuss the relationship between man and
machine are quite commonplace, appearing in every discipline from art to
medicine to business. Pop culture explores the implications of posthumanism
through various visual means, creating video games, science fiction serials, films,
music and so on, through which both the promising and hopeful aspects of
man/machine hybrids, as well as the more horrific and graphic possibilities of
man/machine blends can be investigated.
In scholarly writing, it may seem that we have arrived at the end of the
debate about what posthumanism looks like. With cell phones in our pockets,
mp3 players in our ears, and email and internet video at our fingertips, the
technologically-enabled cyborg may be the student who just walked into your
classroom. Of course, the cyborg figure also provokes a certain anxiety that
Allucquére Rosanne Stone, in her article “Will the Real Body Please Stand Up?:
Boundary Stories about Virtual Cultures,” titles “cyborg envy.” She explains
cyborg envy as the desire to transcend the boundaries that separate human from
machine, a desire “to penetrate and merge” (108). This suggests the possibility
that those interested in posthumanism are putting too much faith in the
technologically-enhanced body to lead us away from humanism.
Academic treatments emerging from posthumanism have provided
thoughtful discussions on topics such as the ethical issues surrounding medical
advances, communication technologies, labor mechanization, and fictional
worlds. Each of these investigations necessarily places these technologies in the
4

context of some definition of the human, and these technologies’ expansion or
contraction of the humanity of the subject. In the past, it was easy to describe
and investigate new technologies in terms of their relationship to humans—how
they made our lives easier, what they could help us do better and faster, and
what new things they could help us accomplish. As technology becomes more
present and more advanced, it is taking over many of the activities previously
undertaken in cooperation with humans. Machines are doing things all by
themselves. As the technology has changed, our relationship to technology has
also changed, requiring new and better ways to mediate our connection. The
increasing autonomy of machines has demanded new ways of thinking and
talking about the human-machine connection, especially in the past few decades.

Education, Literacy, and Technology
The proliferation of personal computers in the 1990’s brought
technological literacy to the forefront of discussions about education in the United
States. While the U.S. Department of Education was defining technological
literacy as “computer skills and the ability to use computers and other technology
to improve learning, productivity, and performance” (Getting 5), the academy was
developing more nuanced and careful definitions.
This new attention to technology and its use in education developed into
an entirely new area for study, complete with its own journals and scholars
devoted to its examination. Sponsored by The Council on Technology Teacher
Education and the International Technology Education Association, The Journal
5

of Technology Education published its first issue in the Fall of 1989 in order to fill
a gap in the scholarly conversation where practitioners and theorists could
exchange dialogue about the place of technology in public schools, particularly
as it was becoming more and more accessible. In those early issues,
contributors discussed issues surrounding the use of technology in the classroom
and its use in individual disciplines, pedagogical practice, and areas for further
study. All of these areas, in some manner, contributed to our changing
understandings about issues of technological literacy.
In a 1993 issue of The Journal of Technology Education, Walter Waetjen
cautions, “[technological literacy] surely cannot be a neutrally intended term since
it is related to educational endeavors and all such endeavors are laden with
purpose or value, whether we like it or not, and whether we intend it or not” (9).
Issues of technological literacy are laden with political and ethical debate, as well
as the strong economic and social pressures attendant to all education. In
communication scholarship, theorists have shaped our understanding of the
posthuman by building upon the discussions of technological and electronic
literacy. For the most part, these understandings have included both the
promises and problems of this evolving literacy.
The definition of technological literacy offered by the U.S. Department of
Education adopts a rosy view of the effects of our use of technology, one which
promises progress and improvement in measurable quantities such as
productivity. In Cyberculture, Cyborgs and Science Fiction: Consciousness and
the Posthuman, William Haney calls this the “friendly version of posthumanism,
6

[in which] tools such as the pen or the computer are not just external aids but
integral aspects of the problem-solving systems that civilizations have developed
over the ages” (59). In other words, this approach to technological literacy
humanizes technology by placing it within the narrative of human progress and
continuous improvement. In this narrative, technology does not threaten the
category of the human because humans have dominated it to their will, and thus,
humanism is not in crisis.
This narrative ignores the more threatening aspects of posthumanism
which transgress the boundaries of identity, meaning, and knowledge. It ignores
the possibility that the “irreversible process often referred to as progress tends to
strip the human body and mind of their systems of initiative and defense,
reassigning these functions to technological artifacts” (Baudrillard 34). This is
Baudrillard’s invocation in “Prophylaxis and Virulence” of the fear voiced by
Socrates over 2000 years ago that writing would destroy one’s memory, that
technology will assume the very functions which make us human. It’s a truism
that as our world becomes more technologically advanced, the number of people
who have a firm understanding of the technologies enabling everyday life
decreases.
Consider the case of Alaska senator Ted Stevens, who when discussing
net neutrality (the idea that content and services on the internet should not be
restricted), said this about the internet: “It's not a big truck. It's a series of tubes.”
Earlier he explained that “an Internet” (what most would call an “email”) sent by
his staff had been delayed—perhaps he believed the tubes were clogged. Not
7

only are politicians afflicted with such technological illiteracy. Consider how
increasingly difficult it is for people to fix their own cars, to identify the parts of
major appliances, or to explain how a UPC code reader works. To paraphrase
Arthur C. Clarke: any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from
magic.
The goal of technological literacy is not simply to get people to understand
the mechanics of and the jargon associated with the machines around them. Nor
can technological literacy simply mean the ability to use technology. Both
approaches leave individuals unprepared to perceive the ideological values
embedded in all technologies. Rather, the proliferation of newer and more
abundant technologies demand Cynthia Selfe’s "critical technological literacy,"
which she defines as "the complex set of socially and culturally situated values,
practices, and skills involved in operating linguistically within the context of
electronic environments, including reading, writing, and communicating”
(Technology 148). Such a critical literacy requires more than being able to
operate within technology-saturated environments, but also to recognize how
these environments operate on us, and to recognize the mutually constitutive
relation we have with technology, a relation which is never just an enhancement
(or corrosion) of our humanity, but a recognition of a dialectic without which
humanity could not be conceived.
A step beyond technological literacy, critical technological literacy, Selfe
says, encourages a “reflective awareness of these social and cultural
phenomena.” Now firmly in the posthuman era, it is time to revisit our
8

understanding of critical technological literacy in order to both better utilize
technologies and to examine the ideological values from which and through
which these technologies function. By reflecting on the state of higher education,
this dissertation hopes to advance a critical understanding of the posthuman
fusion of human and machine, and a shift towards understanding human as
machine.

Critical Posthumanism
"The posthuman does not really mean the end of humanity."
- N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman
This dissertation attempts to theorize the relation between the posthuman
and higher education by looking at three sites of inquiry: bodies, classrooms, and
institutions. These sites do not exhaust the points of contact between the
posthuman and the academy. Nor do they attempt to predict the origins or goals
of posthumanist theory. Rather, posthumanism’s own insistence on the
significance of the complexity of embodiment and materiality suggests the
relevance of selecting positions from/in/through which to understand the lived
experience of posthumanism. The positions of student, teacher, and
administrator (or, if you like, the locations of desk, classroom, and office), will be
used to understand the evolving relationship between posthumanism and higher
education. The overall question it asks is: what does it mean to teach
posthumans? To answer this question, this dissertation turns toward scholarship
on the body in order to understand the virtual/material presence that students
9

maintain, as well as pedagogies that incorporate video games and service
learning in order to prepare students for posthuman work and leisure
environments.
As Katherine Hayles notes in the statement above, the posthuman does
not mean an end to humanism; it does not mean an end to the belief in the
centrality of the human experience (and the human in experience).
Posthumanism does not attempt to ring the death knell of the subject because to
do so would be to deny the always already constructed nature of subjectivity, to
imagine a pure state of selfhood from which technology now separates us. As
Neil Badmington writes: “There is no pure outside to which ‘we’ can leap. To
oppose humanism by claiming to have left it behind is to overlook the way that
opposition is articulated” (9). To critique humanism is to speak the language of
man that constitutes humanism. Just as Derrida’s deconstruction used the
language of the text to enable deconstruction, thereby inhabiting the text even
more fully, we can only extend posthumanism by inhabiting the language and
concerns of the humanistic tradition. As Richard Rorty put it, the “trouble with
arguments against the use of a familiar and time-honored vocabulary is that they
are expected to be phrased in that very vocabulary” (8). The vocabulary (and
influence) of humanism can not be dismissed, nor should it be.
One might say that we have always been posthuman, especially if one
recognizes the many ways in which humanism has recurrently been in crisis. In
Ecrits, Jacques Lacan said that after Freud, who identified an unconscious
motivation to our conscious action, “the very centre of the human being was no
10

longer to be found at the place assigned to it by a whole humanist tradition”
(114). By positing an unconscious which influenced the thoughts and actions of a
person without it being readily available for scrutiny, Freud undercut the notion of
a rational and self-aware ego upon which post-Enlightenment humanism was
built. This is the initiation of the modern crisis in humanism—the scientific
observation that we are neither in total control of our own bodies, nor totally
aware of our own selves. But we no longer need Freud to feel that the essence of
our humanity is in question. Our vastly increased exposure to media, the decline
in traditional communities, the diversification of American culture, the integration
of international economies, and the development of terror and fear as weapons in
global conflict have all intensified this feeling of loss of control.
The composing of the self to which this dissertation’s title alludes is not
simply a reference to an impossibility, or to a nostalgia already deconstructed by
postmodern and poststructuralist accounts of subjectivity, but rather an
admission that humanism continues to be a significant force because subjectivity
has always been constructed in collaboration with other bodies, discourses, and
technologies. To be human is to part of a dynamic distributed system of thought,
word, and image which necessarily limits the usefulness of binaries such as
human/inhuman or private/public. Critical insights from a number of different
theoretical schools enable us to track the composition of posthuman subjectivity.
William Spanos tells us that there are many “manifestations of
posthumanist theory—Heidegger’s destruction, Derrida’s deconstruction, Lacan’s
psychoanalysis, Kristeva’s semiotics, Foucault’s genealogy, [and] Althusser’s
11

neo-Marxism” (189). Michel Foucault explicitly links the construction of self with
intentional techniques he has called “technologies of the self”: those activities
which "permit individuals to effect by their own means . . . a certain number of
operations on their own bodies, and souls, thought, conduct, and way of being"
(Technologies 18). Humanism is always in process and “never manages to
constitute itself; it forever rewrites itself as posthumanism” (Badmington 9).
The American university in general, and the humanities specifically, are
struggling to make sense of its place in a culture shaped by fast capitalism,
oppositional politics, boutique multiculturalism, social hierarchies, free markets,
technological revolution, international conflict, and a host of other phenomena
that challenge the university as a site of traditional humanistic inquiry. At the
same time, these forces reinforce the university’s more modern roles in the
knowledge economy as a credentialing service, gatekeeper, and commercial
incubator. Such a turn towards vocationalism represents yet another crisis of
humanism. The contemporary world is characterized by transgressed
boundaries, flexible identities, radical transparency, ubiquitous technology,
networked subjectivity, and a loss of confidence in the universal narratives and
notions of essential humanity that provided impetus to Western thinking for
millennia. Teachers, students, and administrators are struggling, whether they
know it or not, to exist in a posthuman world.
But “making sense” of such phenomena may be precisely what is making
it difficult for higher education to fully embrace posthumanism, for meaning is
conventionally a belief in the consequentiality and centrality of human action,
12

meaningfulness made available through the human faculties valued by
Enlightenment means of inquiry. The idea of a university is, put simply, founded
in humanism. As Spanos notes in The End of Education: Towards
Posthumanism, the assumptions of the “modern humanist university—its abiding
commitment to disinterested inquiry, to general education (the core curriculum or
common body of indispensable knowledge), and to the principle that the
university constitutes a value-free (apolitical) space” are extensions of the
Enlightenment project which puts its ultimate faith in humanity as opposed to a
divine or supernatural figure (xvii). But these commitments can no longer be
assumed. Increasingly, universities are moving toward interested inquiry
(commercially viable and sponsored research), away from general education (in
the shape of specialized degree programs), and toward politicized curriculums
(witness the ongoing debates over indoctrination fueling the proposals of an
Academic Bill of Rights by the likes of David Horowitz).
In light of these movements, the liberal humanism on which higher
education is often justified may be fueling an ongoing crisis that originated in a
contradiction between the humanist roots of academia and the posthuman world
into which students are graduating and to which universities are attempting to
appeal. In fact, Spanos identifies this crisis as emerging from the structure of the
university itself, which divides knowledge into disciplinary types, separating
philosophical inquiry from scientific inquiry—truth from power. It is only in
recognizing the “complicity of truth and power” underlying both liberal and
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conservative reforms, he writes, that we can develop programmatic alternatives
that do not merely return us to an uncritical humanism (xiv).
The remainder of this chapter provides an introduction to posthumanist
theory, emphasizing the ways in which the traditionally humanistic goals of higher
education relate to the posthuman world where students, teachers, and
administrators exist. It considers current academic treatments of the posthuman
and the tendency to associate the posthuman most strongly with technological
change, rather on the many changes in material, political, and economic
conditions of social life that affect what it means to be human. It identifies three
major areas of posthumanist inquiry that will resurface throughout all of the
chapters: changes in our ideas of humanity, identity, and community.

Humanity Redux
“There is in effect something that humans are or have to be, but this
something is not an essence nor properly a thing: It is the simple
fact of one’s own existence as possibility or potentiality.”
– Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community
As Neil Badmington points out in the introduction to his edited collection,
Posthumanism, even such an ambiguous term may serve as a “convenient
shorthand for a general crisis in something that ‘we’ must just as helplessly call
‘humanism’” (2). Humanism is no simple concept.
Tracing the term “humanism” through its use in various scholarship,
Badmington posits that “humanism” is a “wonderfully vague concept,” one whose
meaning depends greatly on the context in which it is used (2). In America and
14

Britain, for instance, the term was heavily associated with secularism. While this
tradition serves to posit humanism as a progressive alternative to the domination
of autocracy and theocracy, in Humanism and Anti-Humanism, Kate Soper notes
that it also “appeals (positively) to the notion of a core humanity or common
essential feature in terms of which human beings can be defined and
understood” (11–12). Even among its scholars, there is divergence in its
definition.
The helplessness Badmington references above is a recurrent theme in
discussions of posthumanism. In 1977, Ihab Hassan wrote that posthumanism
was a “dubious neologism” that may be “another image of man’s recurrent selfhate” or a “hint at the potential in our culture” (Qtd. in Badmington 2). He further
stated that “five hundred years of humanism may be coming to an end, as
humanism transforms itself into something that we must helplessly call
posthumanism.” This sense of loss (of control, of tradition, of identity, of a center,
of purpose, of comfort) is part of the crisis of humanism. In order to distinguish
what is rejected, lost, and/or modified in the movement to posthumanism, it may
make sense to start off with some discussion with what is at stake in the term
“humanism.”
Discussing humanism in a 1977 interview included in Language, CounterMemory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interview, Michel Foucault explains why
the ideology of humanism has maintained its hold on western culture. Foucault
states, humanism is the
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. . . totality of discourse through which Western man is told. . . . Humanism
invented a whole series of sovereignties: the soul (ruling the body, but
subjected to God, consciousness (sovereign in a context of judgment, but
subjected to the necessities of truth), the individual (a titular control of
personal rights subjected to the laws of nature and society), basic freedom
(sovereign within, but accepting the demands of an outside world and
‘aligned with destiny’). In short, humanism is everything in Western
civilization that restricts the desire for power.: the theory of the subject (in
the double sense of the word) is at the heart of humanism and this is why
our culture has tenaciously rejected anything that could weaken its hold
upon us.” (“Revolutionary” 221–22)
Foucault here provides some explanation for the tenaciousness of humanism
and the subjectivity it supports. In this case, humanism is supported by a series
of “sovereignties”—self-contained ruling “entities” in their own right that
complicate each other and that constitute humanism. But even though Foucault
describes such concepts as soul, consciousness, individuality, and freedom as
sovereign ruling powers acting upon the “self,” they are themselves contained
within the larger economy of humanism that subjugates them. Without
humanism, Foucault suggests, the desire for power would exist unrestricted,
leaving current power structures open to critique and challenge.
In “Foucault and the Politics of Resistance” Brent Pickett moves
Foucault’s project forward in a way that is somewhat different than other scholars
by understanding Foucault as a theorist of democracy. This understanding is the
16

means though which Pickett gets at “The humanist question, ‘What Is Man?’.”
Pickett explains that this question “assumes that man has an ahistorical essence,
and thus eliminates the possibility of critique, of reflexive self-creation and
autonomy" (451–52). For Foucault, humanism is therefore a conservative force
necessary for maintaining the status quo, since it is through a concept of the
human that individuals accept current power relations, seeing them as an
extension of the human essence, and therefore constrain their desire for radical
change.
Perhaps this, limiting the desire for change, is why Donna Haraway
describes her “Cyborg Manifesto” as an “ironic political myth.” She describes
using irony as a “rhetorical strategy and a political method” that she would like to
see used in feminism to hold “incompatiple things together because both or all
are necessary and true” (149). At the center of this irony is the cyborg, a figure
that “is our ontology; it gives us our politics” (69; 70). Haraway cautions against
remaining locked within the “comfortable old hierarchical dominations”
maintained in traditional institutions of knowledge and power and the reassuring
endorsements of subjectivity and identity presented in narrative and law (77).
Posthumanism gives us the means by which to function outside of those
hierarchies. Moving outside old hierarchies necessitates “fundamental changes
in the nature of class, race, and gender” that attend an increasingly
interconnected world. The new world order emerging from posthumanity “not only
undermines the justifications for patriarchy, colonialism, humanism, positivism,
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essentialism, scientism, and other lamented –isms, but all claims for an organic
or natural standpoint” (76). Knowing that one is human is no longer enough.
The loss of a clear and exclusive definition of the category of “human”
leads us to ask the question asked by Jean-François Lyotard in The Inhuman:
“What if human beings, in humanism’s sense, were in the process of, constrained
into becoming inhuman . . . what if what is ‘proper’ to humankind were to be
inhabited by the inhuman?” (2). In this posthuman world, we find the body and
the mind no longer opposed, but integrated as part of a larger circuit that extends
beyond the individual, incorporating other bodies, other minds, and other
machines into one’s existence. We are no longer merely parts of systems; we are
systems.
Envisioning the body as an integrated system is not unrelated to the move
to an information economy. In the information economy, individuals have access
to an unprecedented amount of information that requires us to find ways to
process, filter, and manage it. Because data is stored in servers and on hard
drives and electronically reproduced, essentially, it is never destroyed. This glut
of information remains invisible within a database until processed and presented,
and demands increasingly sophisticated visualization techniques to make the
data coherent. As Johndan Johnson-Eilola, a communication theorist who deals
with issues surrounding the information economy, writes, such databases “can
no longer be processed by the user as a coherent structure, but constitutes a
data cloud” (200). The many online services that allow users to establish
personalized “portals” through which they can connect to selected information
18

feeds and network with acquaintances of their choosing are a marker of the
degree to which the technologies needed to process large amounts of
information have become part of our personal identities.
And information does not merely flow to the user. With the introduction of
web 2.0 technologies that allow users to supply the content of web sites, this is
also a world in which we are increasingly defined by the information we offer
willingly as online text or uploaded media. Consider, for example, the incredible
growth in the content of a site such as YouTube, which allows users to contribute
to the database and offers tools for users to sort, select, and comment on its
content. Not all information is willingly given, however; much is unknowingly
collected about us through internet cookies and other (less benign) code scripts.
Companies mine this surreptitiously collected data, for instance, in order to
discover patterns that can help them identify potential consumers. In the
contemporary world, all of us have taken on a virtual identity that is being
recorded and analyzed elsewhere.

Identity Redux
“In cyberspace, I can change my self as easily as I change clothes.
Identity becomes infinitely plastic in a play of images that knows no
.end. Consistency is no longer a virtue but becomes a vice;
….integration is limitation. With everything always shifting,
everyone is no one.”
– Mark C. Taylor and Esa Saarinen, Imagologies
Over the last fifty years, composition scholars have developed various
methods for understanding the construction and maintenance of identity and
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meaning through writing and for designing and assessing effective methods for
enhancing student literacy. At the heart of most pedagogies’ practices is the
assumption of a proper method of engagement. Where humanism posits a
difference between the subject and the object, posthumanism unearths the
always-already relational nature of being. Thus, where humanists might attempt
to understand the role of technology in social life as a question of humans
controlling technology or technology controlling humans, posthumanists see an
interdependent and mutually controlling relationship and move on to questions of
production and consumption rather than strategies of dominance.
Academic accounts of subjectivity have yet to fully articulate the
implications of posthumanism for educational institutions, nor have teachers
determined how best to accommodate these changes pedagogically. Social
construction approaches to identity recognize that the “self fabricates a coherent
identity” from available materials, but in talking of subjects in general, it is
common to fall into a form of environmental determinism that reduces this selffabrication to the convergence of systemic forces (Foucault, “Nietzsche” 145).
Brian Massumi has argued in his book Parables for the Virtual that most
accounts of subject formation “emphasize systemic structurings,” embrace a
language of positionality (of one’s location on a grid, within an “oppositional
framework of culturally constructed significations”) and treat the body as merely
the “local embodiment of ideology” (2–3). These accounts fail to grasp the
complexity of human subjects, he argues, because they portray individuals as
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inhabiting static identity positions between which movement is possible rather
than as subjects continually in motion.
Massumi’s critique of social constructionist theories of subjectivity
corresponds well with Mark C. Taylor’s description in The Moment of Complexity
of the change from the “Cold War system [of grids] to network culture” that Taylor
argues began in 1989 (23). According to Taylor, a movement from walls to webs
was significant because “walls divide and seclude in an effort to impose order
and control, [and] webs link and relate, entangling everyone in multiple, mutating,
and mutually defining connections” (Moment 23). Living in posthuman network
culture constitutes a change in what it means to be a subject—a “self—if, indeed
this term any longer makes sense—is a node in a complex network of relations. .
. . subjectivity is nodular” (Moment 231). Nodular selves, according to Masumi,
must necessarily accept what he calls the body’s “incorporeal materialism”—the
interweaving of the material and the virtual (15). Only then can we see our bodies
as “incarnations of worldwide webs and global networks” (Taylor Moment 17).
Living in such a world is, to use Jean-François Lyotard’s term, living with
the differend—the convergence of incommensurable language games in a world
increasingly connected and interdependent, a world in which discourses slide
across each other like Saussure’s signifiers, revealing the complexity and
messiness of being an effective composer, citizen, and intellectual. Posthumanity
exposes the constructedness of all discourse, especially that composing
humanism. As Foucault writes, “[p]osthumanism exposes the secret behind the
grand narratives of humanism, the ‘secret that they have no essence or that their
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essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms’” (“Nietzsche”
142). As another form of constructedness, posthumanism thus constitutes both a
challenge to and an extension of the humanist project—an extension which
opens up the term human to include the very concepts and notions once
considerd to be in opposition to it, such as machines.
In How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature,
and Informatics, Katherine Hayles notes that the idea of a more inclusive
definition of “human” is not new. She notes that a controversial test proposed by
Alan Turing in his 1950 paper "Computer Machinery and Intelligence," lays bare
the anxiety about the openness of the human. In this test, the subject sits in a
room with two computer terminals and uses them to communicate with two
entities in order to determine which is the machine and which is the human. In an
earlier experiment by Turing, he asked people to interact with two people via
computer terminal and determine which was a man and which was a woman. It
was Turing’s thesis, reports Hayles, that “If you cannot tell the intelligent machine
from the intelligent human, your failure proves, Turing argued, that machines can
think” (How xi). For Hayles, it is not important whether a person can determine
the difference between man, woman, or machine. Rather, the “important
intervention comes much earlier, when the test puts you into a cybernetic circuit
that splices your will, desire, and perception into a distributed cognitive system in
which represented bodies are joined with enacted bodies through mutating and
flexible machine interfaces” (How xiv). The design of the test already shows our
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posthuman identity by placing us into a network made of man, woman, and
machine.
Identification of who is and who is not a human being has been a common
element of work attempting to deal with the crisis in humanism. It is not
surprising to find that works of science fiction are illustrative examples. Based on
Philip K. Dick’s novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? Ridley Scott’s
movie Bladerunner perhaps best exemplifies the anxiety over the lack of
difference between the human and the artificial. In this film, the main character is
an expert in telling the difference between humans and replicants—robots who
are so nearly identical to human beings that most cannot distinguish one from the
other. The Turing test attempts to ascertain how prepared we are for an age in
which technology has called into question who and what qualifies for the label of
“human.” Hayles argues that such an age is already upon us. Hayles explains
that a later test, one designed originally by Hans Moravec and carried out by
Turing, was “designed to show that machines can become the repository of
human consciousness—that machines can, for all practical purposes, become
human beings.” Hayles announces, “you are the cyborg, and the cyborg is you”
(How xii). The narrowing difference between human and machine is at once
exciting and threatening; whether one identifies with humanism or posthumanism
determines how one responds to living in the “polymorphous, information system”
that Haraway calls the “informatics of domination” (77).
Much of the scholarship on posthumanism deemphasizes the traditional
focus on meaning that is at the center of humanism, and instead looks at social
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life as an assemblage of machines both human and inhuman. Perhaps best
known for their collaborative work on capitalism, Gilles Deleuze and Felix
Guattari argue, it is accurate to think of ourselves, literally, as machines. In their
work Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari explore how we are neither organisms
(unified wholes with a stable identity and knowable purpose) nor mechanisms
(mechanical objects with a prescribed functionality), but “desiring machines”
focused on production rather than representation (5). Claire Colebrook, in
support of her examination of Deleuze, explains that seeing ourselves as
machines denies us the solipsism of the Romantic notion of identity:
. . . [b]ecause a machine has no subjectivity or organising center, it is
nothing more than the connections and productions it makes; it is what it
does. It therefore has no home or ground; it is a constant process of
deterritorialization, or becoming other than itself. (55–56)
Nodular subjectivity is machine subjectivity, an identity formed through relation
and connectivity rather than in isolation. “Plugging in” is the prototypical move of
cyborg subjects, not interpretation or representation; “every machine is a
machine connected to another machine” (Deleuze and Guattari 6). The challenge
of posthumanism to teachers and administrators is to develop programs that
enable students to become critically literate in the technologies that compose
posthumanism. These technologies are not simply the digital tools that we plug
into the wall. These technologies are the modes of being, ways of thinking, the
soft and hard skills of contemporary communication, and the ability to adapt and
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develop skill sets appropriate to emergent technologies, modes of being, and
ways of thinking.

Community Redux
“There is no end to the net. Every destination is a point of departure
and every point of departure is a destination. Apparent terminals
are actually relays in a circuit that is forever in motion.”
- Mark C. Taylor and Esa Saarinen, Imagologies “Net” 12)
Theorists of posthumanism often point to the internet as the realization of
networked community. The internet offers seemingly infinite connectivity,
allowing like-minded individuals to congregate despite physical boundaries. And
much of the software native to the internet—hypertext, blogs, and wikis, for
instance–is naturally interactive and/or collaborative. The latest application of socalled “web 2.0” technologies which depend upon user-supplied content, as well
as the emergence of new forms of intellectual property licensing, have heralded a
new age of interactive communication and digital interdependence. These are
the same technologies that have led to announcing “you” as the Time magazine
person of the year. In the academy, such changes have led to a closer
interrogation of the visual aspects of communication, greater focus on multimodal
genres, and an orientation to producing documents for public consumption. But
the exact shape that online communities will take, and how these communities
will overlap with, supplement, or replace face-to-face communities is still unclear.
What is most important to note, however, is that these communities are just one
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instance of what posthumanists have predicted: communities built, not around
racial or ethnic ties, but around shared interest and affiliation.
Giorgio Agamben, perhaps best known for his work on biopolitics, explains
in The Coming Community that it is possible for human community to exist
without humanism. Part of Agamben’s project is to develop an ethics for human
beings that rejects the idea of the individual as an example of an essential
humanity. As he writes,
the point of any departure for any discourse on [posthuman] ethics is that
there is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological
destiny that humans must enact or realize. This is the only reason why
something like an ethics can exist, because it is clear that if humans were
or had to be this or that substance, this or that destiny, no ethical
experience would be possible—there would only be tasks to be done. (43)
Posthuman community must emerge without the comfort of moral certainty to
guide it. Ethics must emerge when there is no code to which all participants
proscribe, no authority which all recognize. It is “because of this things become
complicated; precisely because of this ethics becomes effective” (43).
Posthumanism in Agamben’s view is thus a more ethical worldview because it
demands ethics for humans to live together. Such a community is classless, for
technology has created “a single planetary petty bourgeoisie, in which all the old
social classes are dissolved: The petty bourgeoisie has inherited the world and is
the form in which humanity has survived nihilism” (63). It is not coincidental that
the internet is the building site of such community, as it reproduces exactly, with
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its openness, what Terry Eagleton calls the "bourgeoisie's dream of freedom": "a
society of petty producers whose endlessly available, utterly inexhaustible
commodity is discourse itself" (16–17). Cyborgs dream this dream well since, in
Haraway’s words: “[w]riting is pre-eminently the technology of cyborgs” (81).
Rather than individuals identifying themselves as members of a class—
human—that assumes the pre-existence of a natural set of qualities, Agamben
calls upon humans to be “whatever beings” who are “expropriated of all identity,
so as to appropriate belonging itself” (10). It is a belief that this process of
expropriation frees individuals from the “false dilemma that obliges knowledge to
choose between the ineffability of the individual and the intelligibility of the
universal” (1). Agamben writes, “The coming being is whatever being.” Because
whatever being is never a stable identity, the one who speaks and acts
. . . is always a multiplicity. Even within the person who speaks and acts.
All of us are ‘groupuscules.’ Representation no longer exists; there’s only
action—theoretical action and practical action which serve as relays and
form networks. (Foucault and Deleuze 206–207)
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, in their neo-Marxist Multitude: War and
Democracy in the Age of Empire, take this notion of multiplicity and develop their
own concept of the “multitude” throughout the text. “Multitude” is their way of
identifying the possibility of a cohesive proletariat that is neither caught in
postmodern fragmentation nor unified under a single human banner. Rather, it
carries a sort of subjectivity that comes forth from commonality.
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This figure of plural democracy, which refuses to discount the material
specificity of its constituent singularities, is a perfect analog for posthuman
beings. Hardt and Negri suggest that the multitude is a coalition always being
assembled and reassembled, “creating the social relations and institutions of a
new society” (348). By engaging individuals in the biopolitics of the “cooperative
and communicative networks of social labor,” it “constantly creates a new social
being, a new human nature.” This new social being is not merely virtual, since
the
. . . conditions of the production and reproduction of the social life of the
multitude, from its most general and abstract aspects to the most concrete
and subtle, are developed within the continuous encounters,
communications, and concatenations of bodies. (Hardt and Negri 348)
The posthuman is too often associated merely with the virtual digital horizons of
cyberspace first made popular by William Gibson’s gritty vision of cyberpunk chic
in his 1984 novel Neuromancer. Hardt and Negri remind us that bodies, (which
cyberpunk texts often refer derisively to as “meat”), are an integral part of the
posthuman circuit. We are not leaving them behind; we are acknowledging their
potential as one of many nodes in the circuit of humanity.

Chapter Overview
Chapter 2 looks to the centrality of the body as a site of theorizing the
posthuman, and examines how this centrality restricts posthumanism from
advocating a progressive narrative of humanity and technology. It looks at
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technologies of the self as markers of a posthuman relation to the body in which
material and immaterial prostheses contribute to a networked subjectivity. For
instance, it looks to the representation of bodies in video texts distributed as
parts of business communication pedagogies as examples of our uneasiness
with the posthuman. These examples provide models of the body’s role in a form
of self-composing and gendered politics.
Chapter 3 analyzes the pedagogical assumptions that inform modern
pedagogy, considering the status of knowledge, experience, and technology in
the posthumanist classroom. The expansion of online learning and the offering of
classes using electronic communication tools such as blogs, wikis, and online
audio and video, and even 3-D online spaces such as the Second Life online
environment expand our notion of both the classroom and the traditional
disciplinary formations of the academy. Specifically, this chapter looks at the
educational potential of video games and the role that social networks may
already play in the teaching of writing in our posthuman world.
Looking primarily at the games King’s Quest and Everquest, this chapter
maintains that modern video games provide situations in which being a
successful gamer entails doing technical writing as a member of a gaming
community. These communities provide a good example of how individuals
inhabit the networked cognition attendant to posthumanism. Current theorists of
video games in the field of education seem unaware of the vast scholarship in
rhetoric and composition on the central role that communities play in the
circulation of discourse and the maintenance of standards for that discourse.
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Writing teachers, as long-time theorists of the social nature of discourse and the
role of media in subjectivity, are well-positioned to take advantage of the
educational potential of video games, and to explain the posthuman basis for
their efficacy.
Chapter 4 expands upon the previous chapter’s recognition of the
education happening beyond the classroom to look at the institutional embrace of
service learning. It considers the expansion of service learning as a
materialization of the university’s networking with the community, but also
questions the economic forces which limit the types of connections being made
and the effect of such partnerships on the traditional goals of liberal education.
Universities have embraced service as a way to create and distribute knowledge
about the academy and its inhabitants in order to build market share. But rarely
do educators acknowledge how the experience of service learning mimics and
prepares for students for working in the distributed work environments enacted in
posthuman workplaces.
In the worst cases, service learning unintentionally legitimizes the
authority of market-savvy institutions by providing them a way to signify their
commitment to the public good while allowing them to avoid producing significant
changes in the communities they serve. By looking at the conditions that have
made service learning approaches more viable than other pedagogies in today’s
academic climate, this chapter draws attention to how the institutional embrace of
service learning in a knowledge economy is based, not just on humanistic
justifications, but on posthumanistic ones as well.
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Chapter 5 concludes by suggesting some ways in which universities may
address the posthuman without simply denying the continuing influence of their
humanistic legacies, economic pressures, students’ desires, and technologyfixated policies. It looks to politics as the most necessary application of
posthumanism, identifying insights about identity, community, and humanity that
are inseparable form the desire for democratic governance, and to the
relationship between the one and the many that underlies all posthumanist
attempts to expand these categories. It questions the viability of virtual
communities as critical habitats for posthumans, and suggests that the internet
and other networking technologies are just as likely to be settled by those
seeking to construct disengaged enclaves as they are to be appropriated by
those seeking new forms of connection and distribution. The posthuman
encompasses the full range of human discourse, and thus we should not be
surprised when a posthuman education does not work the way we intend it to.
Now, it is to bodies that I now turn in Chapter 2, to the original locus of
posthumanist thought and its greatest challenge and resource. The body in
posthumanism must be incredibly elastic, belonging not only to the individual but
to the multitude, embodying not only one identity, but many, and serving not only
as the interface with the physical world, but as the circuit through which the world
interfaces with the individual. It can be the “meat” that must be transcended, or
the fleshy palette which makes cybernetic enhancement possible in the first
place. It provides access to an array of rhetorics based on visual, oral, textual,
and haptic (tactile) systems of meaning. It is, in short, the embodiment of all the
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contradictions which make us simultaneously both human and posthuman. All
the while, the subject must resist the body’s seductive offer of empirical solipsism
and narcissistic privacy. Posthumans need not leave their bodies behind to
escape humanism, but they do need to recognize it for the technology that it is.

32

Chapter 2
Posthuman Bodies
“To live means to participate in dialogue: to ask questions, to
respond, to agree, and so forth. One participates in this dialogue
with his whole life; with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with his
whole body and deeds.”
- Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin, “Towards a Reworking of the Dostoevsky Book”
The body, regarded as our primary interface with the material world and
our enduring filter for physical experience, is the privileged site of humanism. For
humanists, it is the housing of the senses, which is considered crucial to
experience and thus to development. A notion of individual development entails
the recognition that individual identity is subject to change. The humanist
conception of such change is cast in terms of self actualization. Clearly, the
notion of self actualization challenges the mind/body binary of the Cartesian
“cogito ergo sum.” Nevertheless, the humanist self of an integrated mind and
body remains a singular embodiment of subjectivity.
The humanist self is a self-enclosed one where the mind resides within the
body and where the body is, in a sense, free from those element s outside of it.
This conceptualization of the humanist self, of the body as a singular entity, may
serve to limit posthuman thought. In reality, the body is affected by any number
of outside networks.
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The self is a configuration of information patterns we are just now able to
see as something that doesn’t really belong to us. Medical researchers, for
instance, have identified a host of organisms that reside within the human body,
organisms that depend on us for survival and upon which we depend to survive
as well. It’s hard to follow a strict humanism when one learns that our bodies,
whose fingerprints and other physical features are commonly used to establish
identify, do not belong to us alone.
According to Michel Foucault, the fact that our bodies are the home of
identity and dis-identity does not mean they can serve as the basis for any
intellectual project, humanist or posthumanist. He writes,
The body is molded by a great many distinct regimes; it is broken down by
the rhythms of work, rest, and holidays; it is poisoned by food or values,
through eating habits or moral laws; it constructs resistances. . . . Nothing
in man—not even his body—is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis of
self-recognition or for understanding other men. (“Nietzsche” 153)
The body, according to Foucault, cannot be considered a vehicle by which an
individual might break free of regimes if the promise of this freedom is based
upon some inherent internal stability. But as the physical site of all of these
regimes of truth, however, the body can at least be considered useful for the
project of understanding how such regimes operate. These circuits of power and
knowledge are traced upon our flesh.
The focus on the body as a singular entity, even one overrun by social
networks and cultural signification, may limit posthuman thought. Even when
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posthuman theorists praise the machinic assemblages that attempt to break from
the mold of autonomous selfhood, the most important component in the system
is the human. It is the privledged human component that unifies the entire
system. The human might now be much better understood as an integrated
cyborg, but it is still the cyborg’s humanity that is of the most interest.
The emphasis on the human in the posthuman sheds new light on the title
of the opening chapter, “Ecce Post-Homo.” “Ecce Homo” are the Latin words in
the Vulgate translation of the Gospel of John spoken when Pontius Pilate
presents Jesus to a crowd right before his crucifixion. The phrase is most
commonly translated as “behold the man.” Friedrich Nietzsche borrows this
phrase for his autobiography written late in his life, and adds the subtitle “How
One Becomes What One Is.” This subtitle highlights the circularity of being—the
always-alreadiness of our post-humanity. Wherever one looks for the human,
one must also behold the post-human.
In this chapter, I will examine the circulation and representation of various
bodies in pedagogical and public texts as a way of making visible the traces of
our humanism and posthumanism, and of our attitudes toward the material and
the virtual. I am concerned throughout with the many ways in which the body is
implicated in education.

Of Patterns and Presence
It is hard to imagine our bodies not being present. In “Can Thought Go On
Without a Body?”, Lyotard concludes that “thought and the body [are]
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inseparable” in that “each of them is analogous to the other in its relationship with
its respective (sensible, symbolic) environment: the relationship being analogical
in both cases” (135). This analogical relationship means that thinking machines
that work from a binary logic simply cannot reproduce human thought, which is
why Lyotard calls upon engineers to “take the body as model in the manufacture
and programming of artificial intelligence.” Some posthumanists have associated
this analogical capacity with the dialectic of pattern/randomness, a dialectic that
recognizes the various ways that humans make sense of the chaos of
experience. Hayles argues in How We Became Posthuman that posthumanism
eschews the binary of presence/absence in favor of a dialectic of
pattern/randomness because,
. . . meaning is not front-loaded into the system, and the origin does not
act to ground signification . . . . Rather than proceeding along a trajectory
toward a known end, systems evolve toward an open future marked by
contingency and unpredictability. (How 285)
Posthumans are willing to live with uncertainty, with bodies and identities that
cannot be depended upon to be stable. Living in a posthuman age means that
we must process and produce information, despite our realization of instability.
To negotiate information and to interact with the world, both pattern and
randomness are important. Hayles agues that in the age of postmodernism, both
pattern and randomness are “complements or supplements to one another.
Each helps to define the other; each contributes to the flow of information
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through the system” (“Virtual” 152). As such, each component of the dialectic is
vital in the construction of identity and the creation of meaning.
It is important to remember that this shift to a dialectic of
pattern/randomness is a shift away from a binary of presence/absence. Consider
the teaching of writing. Traditionally, the value of writing and speech is
understood through the presence/absence binary. As in any binary, one term is
always favored, and in this case, it is “presence,” which is most commonly
associated with the availability of the body to the senses, unmediated by
technology. Such a binary asks us to accept that the presence of a speaker
ensures that the speech is unmediated. Since the speaker is not present, writing
is secondary to speech. Thus, it is not uncommon for scholars doing historical
research to find that audience members believed that the written text offered only
an imperfect copy of the text as presented orally. When students are tutored to
detect within texts the presence of a strong thesis, of authorial voice and
intention, of rhythmic and vivid language–all elements that supposedly make the
text effective, one must acknowledge the degree to which these ideals are
connected to our paradigm of communication as oral performance, a
performance in which the body is present to the audience.
Once the ideological roots of such an attitude towards speech and writing
were recognized, we were able to consider the degree to which such descriptions
were guided. Not guided by any deficiency in the speech’s transcription, these
attitudes were guided by the commonplace notion, as Leah Marcus explains, that
“writing was not authoritative in itself, but only insofar as it served as a record of
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speech, with the oral prototypon, evanescent though it was, retaining primary
authority” (46). Such attitudes attempt to place speech into a direct relationship
with meaning because the body is the representation of identity. Thus, the
favoring of the presence offered by speech is linked to the favor placed upon the
body by humanistic thought.

Metaphysics and the Masculine (and the Feminine)
Of course, just as speech is favored over writing, so too is masculinity
favored over femininity—each a privileged component of its binary set and each
associated with authority, presence, and authenticity. Instruction in the
development of voice attempts to guarantee that writing, which is seen as a trace
of the absence of the speaker, maintains some of the authority attached to the
originary speech. Writing, as Gayatri Spivak notes, “presents itself as the mark of
an anterior presence, origin, master” (“Preface” xv). In many ways, such an
attitude is traceable back to Plato’s theory of mimesis, which held that writing
was a copy of speech, which itself was a copy of thought, where thought was
considered a imperfect version of the concept in the metaphysical realm of ideas.
Whereas Plato’s theory treated ideas as more real than the bodies that voiced
them, more modern versions of this bias look to the body as the origin of
authenticity.
The privileging of the spoken word over the written word is so strong that
Jacques Derrida has argued that a “metaphysics of presence” exists which
assumes the “absolute proximity of voice and being, of voice and the meaning of
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being, of voice and the ideality of being” (Grammatology 11–12). And many other
“metaphysico-theological roots” cling to this binary arrangement (13). The
primacy of logos—historically, the word of God—in modern discourse is just one
way in which the favoring of presence reinforces other discourses of authority . In
other words, the association of speech/text with presence/absence has farreaching implications for culture in general, especially when the
presence/absence binary is interrogated in relation to other binaries, such as
man/woman. The posthumanist attempt to focus on pattern/randomness as its
structuring dialectic represents a recognition that different modes of being are
only available if existing loci of power are challenged.
The resilience of the presence/absence binary in discourses of authority is
not uninterested, especially since presence has historically been associated with
masculinity and absence has been associated with femininity. The influence of
the metaphysics of presence, especially on those in dominant positions in social
hierarchies, helps to account not only for claims of the superiority of an original
oral performance over the printed record, helps to explain how such a
commitment shapes social relations among men and women, relations invested
with cultural meanings and mediated by oral utterances, bodily performances,
and printed texts.
In a society under the influence of the metaphysics of presence, women
are often denied practice of authorized speech—speech to which presence is
assigned. The source of authorized speech is often connected to the material
public body—for example, a speaker in the public sphere who is granted the
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privilege of the assumption of presence. Thus, the speech of women that
circulates in the private sphere (“private” being in a binary relation to the
assumed “public” field of male speech) is generally excluded from the maledominated economy of presence.
Classical rhetorical training in oral performance provided strong support
for the masculine identity project and the transmission of patriarchal values
associated with the metaphysics of presence. As Andrew Williams writes of
modernism, “The construction of a masculine identity is, in part, derived from the
cultural importance a society attaches to the public behavior of its male
members” (96). By mastering the “graceful command of social intercourse,”
Williams writes, men are able to develop a sense of “autonomous selfhood” (97,
96). Frances Yates provides a genealogy of the use of the body as an aid in
public speech, the effective delivery of which often depended upon one’s
memory. She writes that the “most universally known of all memory textbooks,”
Peter of Ravenna’s 1491 Phoenix, sive artificiosa memoria, popularized the
“classical principle that memory images should if possible resemble people we
know” (Yates 113). This and other practices treated the body as a resource for
developing the memory techniques considered necessary for oral performance.
But these bodies, in order to be useful, needed to be associated with specific
identities (“people we know”). Thus, even when the body was used as a
technology, its usefulness was still predicated upon its close association with
identity.
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Men relied on this sense of selfhood available to them through public
discourse to situate themselves within a history of privileged well spoken men
and to embody, as Quintilian portrayed in his Institutio Oratorio, the performative
ideal of the vir bonus dicendi peritus—the “good man speaking well.” Under such
conditions, speech is the valued mode of interaction with others, and is a nontrivial contribution to the maintenance of patriarchal values. In her work in
examining the body as a site of power, Lynn Enterline claims that educational
institutions participate in the maintenance of these values, and reinforce the
association between speaking ability and subjectivity by drilling students in the
“art of imitating other voices” as part of an undisclosed mission to produce
“properly masculine subjects” (165). Thus, identity is produced through the
disciplining of the body.
Even though students in these schools did engage with the work of
classical poets in textual (rather than oral) form and often produced translations
and other written products, it is important to remember, Martin Elsky writes, that
although “Learned Latin had been separated from its oral base for centuries, it
remained aligned with the classical rhetorical tradition, which conceived of
language as oratory . . . the tradition persisted long after oratory shifted from oral
to written performance” (114). Other scholars have supported Enterline’s claim
that such pedagogies embrace the practice of imitation where by students learn
self-discipline through identifying themselves with a dominant model (Enterline
166). For instance, in The Poetics of Primitive Accumulation: English
Renaissance Culture and the Geneaology of Capital, Richard Halpern has
41

criticized pedagogies of identification from an Althusserian perspective as being
one way in which male subjects became interpellated into patriarchal values.
Gayatri Spivak even claims that such approaches instill a “desire to have a self”
that can be made publicly known, which she calls a form of “masculinist
centralism” (“Explanation” 204).
The degree to which writing pedagogies that fail to question the economy
of presence contribute to the conservative maintenance of social relations
through identification is connected to the “great energy in saying over and over
again what has been learned” that imitative pedagogies ask students to expend
(Ong 41). The “formative power” of these pedagogies is in their commitment to a
crude humanism which isolates the body of the speaker as the origin of the
power of the communicative act (Enterline 25). As Derrida writes, “absolute
presence is constituted as self-presence, as subjectivity,” a subjectivity that
embraces the “absolute will to hear-oneself-speak” (Grammatology 16; Speech
102).
Posthumanist educators interested in avoiding the pedagogical
reinscription of the metaphysics of presence might draw upon the scholarship of
Cheryl Glenn. As part of her project to reclaim the “rhetorical accomplishment of
historical women,” Glenn urges scholars to expand the study of “delivery
(speaking and writing) to include the delivery of silence” (262). She admits that a
“rhetoric of silence might seem peculiar, given the Western tendency to
overvalue speech and speaking out,” but she challenges scholars to trace that
which is usually considered trace-less, and to pursue the possibility of a
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“specifically feminist rhetorical art” structured on productive absence (Glenn 263,
262). The productivity of absence might be translated to the productivity of nonconnection from networks, providing some balance to the excesses of technoutopian posthumanism.
Admittedly, developing a metaphysics of absence could result in simply
inverting the hierarchical relationship between speech and writing (without
necessarily displacing the humanist glorification of the body as the distillery of
identity). Such an inversion is not inevitable because to study oral traditions is
already to study the complex interplay of writing and speech, what Derrida calls a
“plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of presence”
(Grammatology 144). If technology were to deliver this plenitude without entering
into the hierarchy of meaning created by humanism, posthumanists would have
little to say.
But the danger with today’s technological immediacy is that we feel that
we have direct access to the speech because it is delivered in ways that seem
less mediated, less separate from the body than past technologies. Unfortunately
in this ideology, the more we ignore the material embodied context, the more
accurate we believe the representation to be. It is tempting to believe that
technologies such as online chat and video conferencing provide a more
authentic medium for the communication of identity.
We often forget that the interfaces through which we communicate are
laden with political messages and agendas of their own. It is, perhaps, the
seamlessness of the mediums that make them so difficult to identify and
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examine. An individual needs to look no further than the tiny advertisement in
the corner of their computer screen to realize that their chat with a friend isn’t as
pure as it first appears. However, when communication is synchronous, when
information is immediate, it seems authentic.
The immediacy of technologies such as teleconferencing, voice over
internet protocol applications, and synchronous chat provide a false sense of
authenticity. As a result, the technologized subject of posthumanism reinscribes
presence as the privledged term in its binary. Presence continues to be a
defining measure of the efficacy of human communication, and the body its
primary source.

Gender Machines
“A starting point may be . . . to propose that gender, too, as both
representation and as self-representation, is the product of various
social technologies, such as cinema, and of institutionalized
discourses, epistemologies, and critical practices, as well as
practices of daily life.”
- Teresa de Lauretis, “The Technology of Gender”
Gender is a machine hardwired into the body and networked into the
circuits of discourse and technology. As de Lauretis suggests above, we are
already plugged in to a number of technologies and discourses, all of which
contribute to our understanding of ourselves as gendered subjects. As Anne
Balsamo writes, gender is a “determining cultural condition and a social
consequence of technological deployment” (9).The gendered body poses a
special problem for posthumanists, especially those who are feminists as well. If
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we have become posthuman, must we also have become postgender? Does the
move to posthumanism mean the rejection of feminism’s valuation of the lived
experience of men and women?
Presumably, Lyotard would say no, since he claims that the analogizing
power mentioned above is “inconsequential compared to an irreparable
transcendence inscribed on the body by gender difference. . . . This difference
makes thought go on endlessly and won’t allow itself to be thought. . . . this
difference causes infinite thought” (“Can” 140). For Lyotard, posthumanist (or
any) thought cannot exist without gender, which is a necessary part of our
embodied apparatus for thinking in the world.
Perhaps gender is, then, the condition to which can be traced what
Lyotard identifies as our fascination with otherness and difference. Gender
difference is not innocent, however. Unfortunately, the “abstract concept of
gender ‘difference’ is reified as discrete gender identities” (Balsamo 159). In
other words, difference may make thought possible, but it also makes possible
the rigid binary system of gender (as well as race and other forms of bodily
difference) that suggests that men and women are naturally and essentially
different, opening the door to the inscription of what Edward Said calls
“ideologies of difference” upon the body of the other (41).
Many feminists, including Rosi Braidotti, Elspeth Probyn, Elizabeth Grosz,
Linda Singer, Moria Gatens, Anne Balsamo, Susan Bordo, Alison Jaggar, Kathy
Davis, and Judith Butler, have tried to reconceptualize the body within feminism.
Elizabeth Grosz’s “corporeal feminism,” for example, attempts to provide an
45

understanding of gendered bodies that is “compatible with feminist struggles to
undermine patriarchal structures and to form self-defined terms and
representations” (“Notes” 3). Rosi Braidotti’s definition of the “feminist subject of
knowledge” as “rhizomatic, embodied, and, therefore, perfectly artificial; as an
artifact it is machinic, complex, endowed with multiple capacities for
interconnectedness in the impersonal mode” directly appeals to the
posthumanistic thinking of Deleuze in its invocation of rhizomatic machinic being
(162). While not accepted by all feminists, some of whom feel that the focus on
the body is retrogressive, their questions about gender promise to further
understanding about posthumanism.
In Volatile Bodies, Grosz asks: “do bodies, all bodies (even nonhuman
bodies, it must be presumed), have a specifically sexual dimension (whether it be
male or female or hermaphroditic) which is psychically or culturally inscribed
according to its morphology?” (189). Grosz’s question points here to the now
widely accepted distinction between sex and gender (between bodily forms—of
which there are many more than two—and the culturally constructed norms
associated with those forms). The portability of gender, even to the inhuman,
seemingly sanctions the flexibility of posthuman identity, turning gender into just
one more prosthetic, into one more machine that can be plugged into or left on
the workshop floor. But this should also give pause to those who think that
gendered technologies will somehow mean the end of restrictive expectations for
gendered bodies. As Balsamo has shown in her discussions of cosmetic surgery,
female body building, cyberpunk fiction, and virtual avatars, the “meaningfulness
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of gender identity is reproduced in the application of new technologies” to the
body (160).
A series of ads circulated by Microsoft's Macintosh Business Unit (MacBU,
a joint venture between Microsoft and Macintosh computers) is representative of
the reproduction of gender identity through technology. When these ads ran,
MacBU had already drawn the ire of many women when it announced that it was
searching for the most "nimble, determined, Mac-wielding businesswoman
around" in order, in beauty-pageant style, to crown her “Ms. M.o.X.i.e.”
("M.o.X.i.e." stands for "Microsoft Office v. X Integrated Experience") (Dalrymple,
“Searches”).
Although the company viewed this promotion as a progressive recognition
of women's strong presence in the business world, critics were quick to point out
its conservative character. Within twenty-four hours of the Ms. Moxie contest
being announced on MacCentral, an official online news service for Mac users,
the online comments forum attached to the article was filled with over 150
messages that predominantly condemned the contest, beginning with a message
titled "When Equality Is Insulting" and ending with a message titled "Re: Most
Insulting Contest Ever" (morphing along the way into "When Men are Insulting"
and "M$ now seXist") (Dalrymple, “Searches”). Interestingly, a recurring concern
of the respondents was the conflation of success in business with technological
aptitude.
At the same time women were being invited to identify with Mac products,
the Macintosh computer, the Apple, was being identified as woman. The "Ms.
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M.o.X.i.e" contest was announced in the same month that the MacBU ran a
series of ads promoting the interoperability of Microsoft software on Macintosh
hardware, lauded as showing "Macs and PCs sharing a meaningful friendship"
(Dalrymple, "Launches"). Each ad showed a PC and a Mac computer engaging
in some anthropomorphic activity such as playing chess by the pool, or watching
a movie while eating Chinese food (the most recent series of televised Mac ads
takes this analogy to its logical extreme, totally replacing the computers with
human beings named “Mac” and “PC”). The text at the bottom of both print ads
read:
Macs and PCs have never been so compatible. Microsoft Office v. X.
makes Macs and PCs more friendly. It lets Mac users effortlessly open,
share, edit, and save any Office files to make working with PCs a breeze.
Complete with easy-to-use exclusive Mac tools that simplify complex
tasks. And it's built specifically for Mac OS X, so it's the most reliable,
stable, easy-going Office ever. GO=> www.officeformac.com to download
a free 30-day trial of Office v. X. today.
These ads were generally well-received (at the least, they were better received
than the Ms. M.o.X.i.e. contest), but gendered identity was still being reproduced.
It is arguable that the visual presentation—the relative sizes of the PC and the
Mac computers (the PC was larger), the domestic settings (poolside and in a
family room watching TV, in two of the ads), and words like "compatibility" and
"checkmate"—constituted a subtle gendering of the computers in the ads,
suggesting specifically that Macs are female and PCs are male. There are other
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gender markers specific to the individual ads. For instance, in the ad titled "Take
Out Anyone?", the TV remote is positioned in front of the PC while a plate of
untouched food sits in front of the Mac, matching the popular cultural conventions
of men as inveterate channel-surfers and women as needing to have an aloof
relationship to food. Whether the PC has eaten yet is unclear, but he has no
plate and will seemingly eat straight from the box of Chinese food which sits in
front of him, another culturally male convention.
If we accept that these two computers are gendered in this way, then it
becomes significant that the ads suggest that the "complex" Microsoft Office
software is being made accessible to the Mac. In other words, accommodations
are being made for the female so that "working with PCs is a breeze." Microsoft,
as the monolithic, monopolizing, industry-dominating behemoth that it is, easily
fills the role of domineering male presence, which the ad promises will be (in a
newspaper’s Personals-section type of way) a "reliable, stable, easygoing"
companion. The presumption is that women are less technologically adept than
men and need assistance to bring them up to the functional level as men. The
gendered machines of the MacBU ads suggest that “[s]exual differences are both
the input and output of the technological production of gendered bodies”—even if
these bodies are personal computers (Balsamo 158).

Woman Incorporated
The end of World War II saw many women returning from the factory to
the kitchen, giving up jobs to men returning from military service overseas. Since
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that time, women have found ways to increasingly leave the "private" sphere of
domestic labor and enter the "public" sphere of business (though this distinction
is not entirely accurate; women who enter business often do so in addition to
their domestic duties). Numerous responses (including the questionable MacBU
promotions described above) have emerged such as scholarships, associations,
study programs, and awards, alternately promoting and welcoming women into
business fields. In more popular media such as film and television, women have
ceased to be depicted solely as mothers, housewives, and possible mates, and
have been given professional identities as well.
As Balsamo points out, pregnant women become a biological and
eroticized spectacle in which the “womb serves as a metonym for the entire
family body,” a move that endorses the use of reproductive technologies as
“means for exercising power relations on the flesh of the female body” (80, 82).
Representations of pregnant women “signify female gender in a way that
reinforces an essentialist identity for the female body as the maternal body” (9).
In significant ways, the professionalization of women in cultural narratives, like
the working body of Rosie the Riveter, helped oppose reduction of woman to only
wife and mother.
But even if women today are being welcomed more fully to the sphere of
business, it is important to interrogate the reproduction of gender ideologies in
this process. Below I would like to consider two video-based texts that educate
students in business communication skills. One of these texts is a video on how
to give effective oral presentations called "Powerful Presentation Skills," which is
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comprised of a series of videotaped lectures accompanied by bulleted
Powerpoint-like graphics. The other is a CD-ROM supplement called “The Perils
of Pauline” packaged with a popular business communication textbook.
Most schools’ multimedia collections hold videos like “Powerful
Presentation Skills,” which is a straightforward lecture-style presentation
supplemented by video dramatizations about a woman named Carol who is given
a business task by her manager that she feels unprepared for. In the course of
her journey to master the art of giving a professional business presentation,
Carol has help from three coworkers, two men and one woman. What is
significant about the three coworkers is the difference between their backgrounds
and how they are introduced in the video clips. The two men are a maintenance
worker and an intern who arrive on the screen out of nowhere, with no
introduction as to their backgrounds or credentials beyond their job titles (which
are not notable). Yet these men are accepted as natural authorities (by Carol,
and therefore by the viewer) about how to deliver effective presentations,
dispensing information to Carol freely and confidently.
The young male intern is working on a degree in graphic design, so his
opinions about presentation slides is somewhat justified, but when he meets
Carol in the copy room as she is making copies of overhead transparencies, he
picks them up from the table uninvited and begins critiquing them with phrases
like "This is confusing" and "This one's just dumb." Carol immediately asks him to
show her how to do the overheads better, never challenging the authority of his
discourse. It is almost impossible (and this is a symptom of the problem) to
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imagine a female intern walking up and speaking the same way to a male
employee about his professional work.
When we are introduced to Carol's helpful female coworker (who is not a
maintenance worker or intern, but an executive), we see her talking to a group of
other professionals. As Carol approaches from the background, we hear all of the
female coworker's associates compliment her on her excellent presentation skills
(presumably, she has just finished giving a presentation). So, while men can
appear on the screen with natural authority for giving presentations, viewers must
be convinced of a woman's ability to dispense professional advice. It's almost a
given she must be well-dressed and educated as well. In this video, men seem to
be able to transcend their bodies and social positions due to their natural
authority, while women must be presented to the audience in particular ways to
establish their credibility.
I want to turn now to a CD-ROM titled "The Perils of Pauline" (TPoP) and
published by Prentice Hall in 1999 as a supplement to its popular textbook,
Business Communication Today (5th edition, by John Thill and Courtland
Bovée). In TPoP, the reader interacts with a series of on-screen episodes, each
of which begin with an introductory video that establishes a problem at the
workplace and then asks the reader to complete an exercise that will determine
whether Pauline "succeeds" or "fails" at accomplishing the task to her boss' and
coworkers' satisfaction. The reader is then presented with a "failure" video or a
"success" video based on his or her performance on the exercise. Granted, the
most heinous examples of gender stereotyping fall within those videos that
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appear when Pauline "fails" to accomplish the task, but the entire product is
infused with questionable assumptions about gender.
The very narrative of a woman entering business unsure of her abilities
and needing help (from the reader) to succeed is initially suspect (especially
since we find out at the beginning of the CD-ROM that Pauline's sorority voted
her "Most Likely to Succeed"; seemingly, this award has little to do with being
prepared for the business world she is getting a degree to enter). It also doesn't
help that the woman's name is "Pauline Peterson," with both first and last name
being derivatives of conventionally male names (Paul and Peter, respectively),
which are themselves closely associated with the patriarchal hierarchy of
Christianity.
The namesake of "Perils of Pauline" is actually an early 20th-century
"cliffhanger serial" in which the main female character always wound up in a
dangerous predicament at the end of the episode, only to be saved by the male
character at the beginning of the next installment. That the CD-ROM authors are
attempting to reconnect with this cultural paradigm of female helplessness
suggests a conscious willingness to reproduce the ideologies that informed these
films. The picture on the cover of the CD-ROM supplement is questionable as
well, as it shows Pauline with her hands plastered to her cheeks as she opens
her mouth in a wide "O," releasing a perpetual and silent scream at the terror of
being asked to fulfill a business task which she presumably prepared for in her
degree program.
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While there is little overt discussion of gender in the workplace in "Perils of
Pauline," there is ample attention to the notion of difference. In one episode,
Pauline, to her audience's disbelief, makes a gross generalization about
Japanese workers. In another, she insults two male East Indian software
developers with whom she is sent to have lunch in order to procure a business
deal. Cultural difference has an entire episode dedicated to it entitled
"Intercultural Communication." This attention is surprising considering the many
opportunities for the examination of gender relations in the CD-ROM.
Over the course of the episodes, Pauline moves from a male to a female
boss, has a crush on one of her coworkers, and in her second job ends up
managing a male employee that she was previously managed by. One of
Pauline's female coworkers does mention "sexual harassment" once, but only as
a threat against one of her male coworkers when he makes a snide remark about
her losing something because she used it as a bookmark in one of her romance
novels. The other instance where the term "discrimination" arises is when
Pauline is accused of discrimination against a male coworker whom she has
been given the duty of firing, though the basis for the discrimination charge is
vague. There are too many examples of gender-inflected choices made by the
creators of TPoP to cover all of them in depth. I will provide a suggestive list
below to show how gender identity, though never an explicit focus, colors the
entire production:
•

In the introductory video to the entire CD-ROM, we are treated to a
"photo album" of Pauline's life, where we see photos of her fulfilling
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conventional gender roles by being dressed as a child ballerina and on
the arm of a boy going to prom. The voiceover informs us that the only
thing not "boring" about her high school years was the trouble-making
of a boy named Herman Goldblatt, that she went to college where her
sorority voted her "Most Likely to Succeed," and finally that she is
being offered a job at a marketing firm.
•

Pauline's first boss is male and refers to himself jokingly as "god."
Sometimes when the CEO's name is mentioned, angelic voices are
heard (sometimes instead of saying the CEO's name, an individual
gives a meaningful nod and the angelic voices start on cue). There
seems to be no purpose for this except to associate the workplace
hierarchy with the patriarchal hierarchy of organized religion.

•

We do not see female co-workers working. Instead we find them
watching soap operas and reading romance novels. In fact, every
comment from the romance-novel-reading coworker relates to a
character in her romance novel, who reportedly sleeps with the CEO’s
son in order to climb the corporate ladder. As far as the representation
of the extracurricular concerns of males goes, Pauline's boss often
refers accidentally to the sports he plays on company time (tennis, golf,
bowling, swimming), and one male coworker, Leo, has a fascination
with being abducted by space aliens. At first, Leo's fascination might
seem to defy gender stereotyping, since it is not actively "male" like the
boss's sports activity. But Leo himself is not associated with a macho
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masculinity. His bow tie and sweater, excessive dramatics, and other
signs mark him as homosexual, and therefore not bound to represent
masculinity. But his fascination with UFOs is not fruitless like the
female coworker's obsession with romance novels. At the end of the
CD-ROM, he actually accomplishes his dream and is abducted by
aliens.
•

An elderly female secretary mentions her sister once, but only because
the sister is married to an East Indian man, and thus might have
information valuable to Pauline for her lunch with two East Indian
software developers. In other words, the secretary's sister becomes
significant due to her marital status.

•

One featured female client of the firm (who owns a spaghetti sauce
business, as opposed to the software business the East Indian male
clients have) invites Pauline's manager to her home for dinner, though
he is kicked out by the woman's mother when she finds out he's
married. In Pauline's lunch with the East Indian men, the pretext for the
meal is a business exchange. In the case of the spaghetti sauce
episode, the meal is a pretext for a possible marriage. This episode
extends to women in the workplace the insulting stereotype that
women in college are “only there for an M.R.S. degree—i.e. to find a
husband” (Rocker-Gladen).

•

When Pauline is fired from her first job (due to downsizing), she sends
out résumés that she has carefully constructed. In the "success" video,
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a fairy godmother appears to remind her to use the Prentice-Hall
textbook to help her write her résumé (one of the pieces of advice the
fairy godmother delivers: "make it look beautiful, like me"). At the end
of the "success" video for this episode, even after sending out wellwritten résumés, the interview she is granted is one acquired for her by
a male coworker who was also fired.
These are just some examples of the gender-inflected narratives that permeate
this digital pedagogy of TPoP. At a time when what Cynthia Selfe calls the
narrative of the “Un-gendered Utopia” has become popular among educators, in
which we are called to “see and understand computers as educational allies that
can support efforts to create new kinds of educational and economic
opportunities for students—regardless of gender,” it is surprising to find such a
thoroughly gendered production (“Lest” 306). Perhaps Selfe’s title says it all:
“Lest We think the Revolution is a Revolution.”
Not only does Pauline exhibit stereotypically female behavior, she is also
continually framed as incompetent. And since the episodes are designed to be
watched in any order, this incompetence recurs at the beginning (and sometimes
end) of every episode. And Pauline is continually positioned against technology,
of which she admits she has an "intense fear." In one video reminiscent of a
cheesy horror flick, a copier even grows monstrous arms and reaches out to grab
her when she tries to make copies. In another video episode, the male voiceover, presented by a Rod Serling wanna-be from the "Technology Zone"
describes Pauline as an outsider in the world of technology who is "young, eager,
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but technologically ‘tacky.’” He even wonders whether the task of mastering
technology will lead to "electronic eradication for our 'Everywoman.'" Thus,
Pauline's incompetence becomes a synecdoche for the essential technological
incompetence of all women.
At a time when women are entering business and other technology-laden
fields historically reserved for men (and when other more traditionally female
professions, such as teaching, are increasingly mediated by technology), it is
important to understand what texts that introduce women to the discourses of
these fields convey about their subject positions as professionals. Posthuman
ethics requires that gender identities be fluid prostheses available for adoption
and dismissal, that cyborgs be allowed to enact “contradictory, partial, and
strategic” identities (Haraway 74–75). The identity offered by this CD-ROM is
about as far from the cyborg as possible. TPoP fails to heed Haraway’s call to
dissolve the oppositions between human and animal and human and machine,
and to imagine a complexly integrated, rather than simply fearful, relation
between women and technology.
When Pauline is faced with a seemingly insurmountable task, she reacts
in predictable ways. She is unable to speak, often cries, and shuts her eyes.
Carol, the protagonist of the video described earlier, “Powerful Presentation
Skills,” is also often unable to speak, but her bodily reaction to stressful situations
is often fainting. Ultimately, Pauline’s anxiety episodes end with a scream as she
succumbs to a daydream in which she solves the problem through violence.
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Silence is a common signifier for female passivity and lack of competence
in public speaking, which are often constructed in binary form against male
activity and ease in public speaking. As Cheryl Glenn has shown, the history of
public speech is primarily of "vocal, virile, aristocratic males" (262). The
depictions of Carol and Pauline’s reactions to anxiety in the form of crying and
fainting perhaps owe much to Charcot’s clinical performances of hysteria at the
Salpêtrière, where coached performances of hypnotized women convinced Freud
and others of the “radical dissociative trends splitting the consciousness of
hysterics, often in terms of socially commendable and socially censurable roles”
(Bernheimer 7). The “success” and “failure” videos of the TPoP construct the split
consciousness around these commendable and censurable roles.
The split consciousness of Pauline often engages in fantasies of violence.
In one such video episode, Pauline has been tasked with writing a business letter
to a local bank requesting a loan. Instead of working, she files her nails instead.
Conceivably, this could be read as an act of resistance (in the la perruque
tradition of tactical resistance forwarded by Michel de Certeau) to speaking the
language of business, but any notion of resistance is silenced by the voice-over
provided by a Dick Tracy-like investigator, the "letter detective.” After a
condescending opener referring to Pauline's nail-filing as "important business
matters," this voice-over inscribes Pauline's refusal as incompetence rather than
resistance, specifically as a failure to listen to advice from men.
Pauline, unable to voice her intent in the language of business, instead
dreams of getting the loan by holding the loan officer at gunpoint. Female
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violence is here represented as emerging from an inability to communicate, in a
manner I would argue is reminiscent to feminist interpretations of Freud's theory
of hysteria in which the female body becomes the medium in which women
communicate when other access to self-representation is denied to them. It is
possible to see violence as a symptom of female incompetence, but also as the
surplus of denied signification. What Hélène Cixous claims of Freud’s hysteric,
Dora, may be also true of Pauline: she may be an “example of the protesting
force of women” (Qtd. in Bernheimer 1). While female violence could be
considered threatening (especially if emerging out of a coalition with other likeminded individuals), TPoP presents it within a frame that reassures us that
Pauline is alone and calmly filing her nails, not committing the violent act of which
she can only daydream. That the advances of feminism are made safe in TPoP
through the presentation of a solitary (hysteric) body is a strong argument for the
critical importance of the distributed, networked body of posthumanism.

Materiality in Theory
The prominence of the body in posthumanism and the tendency to fall
back into stereotypical narratives when representing the human body in new
media texts suggests that theorists must become more aware of their relation to
the material world. For many, theory is distinguished precisely by its abstract
nature, by its opposition to the material. But this need not be so, not only in the
case of Marxist theorists, but for all scholars. In Constructing Knowledges, Sid
Dobrin relates the debates over the role of theory in composition studies, debates
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centered most often on the relationship between theory and practice. Dobrin
notes that the “direct impact” of this debate upon those who study writing comes
from our twofold professional responsibility—“to participate in a practice, our
pedagogy; and to produce theory that explains the nature, function, and
operation of written discourse” (6). Thus, Dobrin suggests that our professional
responsibilities as educators include a responsible commitment to material
practices.
In regards to our responsibility to produce theory, Dobrin, in the tradition of
Richard Rorty and Stephen Toulmin, makes a distinction between theory with a
small t—“an attempt to arrive at accurate explanations of some phenomena” by
theorizing in ways that are “not necessarily rigid, didactic, or even stable”—and
Theory with a big T—the attempt to produce “universal, generalizable grand
explanations” that attain the status of unassailable law (Dobrin 8, 11). Dobrin
rightly points out that many, while recognizing postmodern critics’ dismissal of the
latter type of Theory, fail to recognize the value of theorizing as a process of
inquiry that leads to “more useful explanations of phenomena for which past
theories could not account” (9).
Dobrin’s call for theorizing that produces useful explanations is something
that posthumanists would definitely agree with. After all, posthumanists recognize
that, to engage the complexity of machinic being, questions of how are more
interesting, and less prone to metaphysical and ideological explanations than
questions of why. In fact, Dobrin even defines theory as “the inference of how all
like things operate based on repeated instances of observation, speculation
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about those observations, and the construction of accurate explanations of what
the phenomenon in question is and how it works” (8, emphasis added). Others
might legitimately call this process “inductive reasoning,” and point out that much
basic science, not just critical theory, happens in this manner. The following
passage from Constructing Knowledges, however, demonstrates further how
ideological explanations can subvert a more responsible engagement with
materiality. Dobrin writes:
Theory is often contrasted with law, as in the “law of physics.” . . . Of
course, postmodern theory has put into question even the most
sacrosanct absolute reliability of laws. For instance, a law of physics
stipulates that water boils at 212 degrees Fahrenheit; however, the boiling
point of water is also dependent upon other variables, such as altitude.
Context must always be considered. So even physical laws may not
operate with the kind of absolute certainty once thought. (8)
Dobrin’s attempt to justify the value of theorizing by displaying its ability to “put
into question even the most sacrosanct absolute reliability of laws” falls short of a
posthuman ethics that is responsible to the theoretical and to the material. The
“Of course” that begins the declaration that postmodern theory has destabilized
the foundation of law suggests that this example is not being presented to defend
a questionable assertion. The following sentence beginning with “For instance”
would then seem to provide unproblematic proof of postmodern theory’s ability to
call into question absolute laws. But this example simply does not work
historically or materially. For starters, the emergence of postmodern theory and
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the revelation that the boiling temperature of water is not universal, but
dependent upon several contextual variables, are separated by at least a
century.
In the 19th century, the work of scientists such as Dutch physicist
Johannes Diderik Van der Waals and Irish chemist Thomas Andrews showed
how boiling points were relative to the pressure of the substance, a phenomena
leading to the pragmatic establishment of a standard pressure at which to define
boiling points that could be compared. Even though scientists recognize that air
pressure is variable from moment to moment, they agree to use what is called
“standard pressure” as a representative measure of pressure at which to
determine boiling points. Standard pressure is that found at sea level and is
quantified as 1 atmosphere [atm] (often converted to kPa [kilopascals] for use in
equations). But even the notion of sea level is misleading, since references to
changes in altitude are really shorthand for changes in air pressure.
The mathematical equivalent of the 212 degrees Fahrenheit that Dobrin
mentions is 100 degrees Celsius. But technically the real boiling point of water is
not 100 degrees Celsius at all, but 99.97 degrees. The multiple ways in which the
boiling point of water is calculated has more to do with expectations about the
audience of the texts in which these definitions rest. High school chemistry
textbook authors, for instance, recognize that high school students typically
cannot measure the difference between 99.97 and 100 degrees Celsius. Even
among scientists, the exact temperature of 99.97 is not used. The International
Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) makes a distinction between the
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normal boiling point of water and the standard boiling point of water (“Notation”
1247).
The normal boiling point of water is indeed 99.97 degrees Celsius, which
holds true at a standard pressure of 1 atm, which is equal to 101.325 kPa. But for
ease of calculations, IUPAC has recommended since 1982 that scientists set the
standard boiling point of water at 99.61 degrees Celsius, which holds true at the
standard pressure of 1 bar, which is equal to the nice round number of 100 kPa.
In this case, scientists have agreed to use a standardized number to represent
the boiling point of water, one that is convenient for calculations rather than one
that is beholden to nature. The choice here is a pragmatic one, not a dogmatic
one.
My point here is not to fault Dobrin for not knowing the true boiling point of
water, but to show how scientists already, without the aid of postmodern theory,
know that descriptions of the boiling point of liquid are only ever made relevant to
a measurement of pressure (which is why all textbooks make reference to boiling
points at standard pressure), and that they also accept the role of social
convention upon scientific measurements, as evidenced in the IUPAC standards.
When Dobrin says that “[c]ontext must always be considered,” he is not impelling
scientists to do anything they do not already do (at least in the context of
descriptions of water’s boiling point). If anything, Dobrin is ignoring the material
contexts of scientific community and inquiry that have historically constrained the
determination of water’s boiling point. Seemingly, he has ignored this context in
order to argue for the value of postmodern theory. Instead, he has displayed the
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exact type of overreaching that has allowed Frederick Crews and others to
deflate the insights of postmodern theory.
Dobrin has taken something that the scientific community knows is
arbitrary and conventional, and suggests it is postmodern theory that allows us to
see that it is arbitrary and conventional. In other words, Dobrin uses knowledge
gained through science (the effect of altitude on air pressure and boiling points)
to attempt to display the supposed shortcomings of science (its attempt to cast its
findings as absolute laws). If theorists rely on the existence of absolute
statements on which to practice their antifoundationalism, they may find few
legitimate targets. If they insist on attacking notions that everyday practitioners
recognize as being contextual and variable, as Dobrin does when he attacks the
inexistent “law of physics” that states that water always boils at 212 degrees
Fahrenheit, then they will appear, at best, naive, and, at worst, phony.
These examples show how far theorists really must come in addressing
the materiality of education. The claims we make for our theories and for our
pedagogies must be responsible to the material and virtual worlds in which we
live. Donna Haraway rightly notes that posthumanists typically eschew the use of
binary formulations such as absolute/relative in order to justify the importance of
their work because they realize that such either/or constructions fail to recognize
the complexity of distributed embodiment and virtual positionality, and restricts
the cyborg economy of “partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity” (71). In
Posthuman Bodies, theorists Judith Halberstam and and Ira Livingston urge that
educators must be prepared to engage posthuman bodies that are the “causes
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and effects of postmodern relations of power and pleasure, virtuality and reality,
sex and its consequences”; bodies that are at once “a technology, a screen,
[and] a projected image” (3). As educators we must be faithful to any number of
positions, ethical in our treatment of various components of the human machine,
and always aware of the possible cultural and political consequences of the
choices we make in the posthuman classroom.
Theoretical discourse appropriate and responsive to these
discursive/material/virtual bodies is perhaps just beginning to emerge, and with it,
a new appreciation for the varied discourses at work in the modern university. As
Hayles writes in “Interrogating the Posthuman Body,” the inability to parse both
material and discursive approaches is “symptomatic of the divide that continues
to separate scientific and technological disciplines on the one hand, which report
their findings in the language of naive realism, and cultural and literary studies on
the other, where discursive approaches are the order of the day” (755).
Posthumanism represents an important opportunity for merging these scholarly
approaches. To paraphrase Haraway, posthumanism is an argument for
pleasure in the confusion of disciplinary boundaries and for responsibility in their
construction (70). The following two chapters look at areas in which academic
disciplines have embraced technologies that contain the potential to bridge the
mental and physical divides transmitted through current disciplinary formations,
and to bridge the perceived gulf between practical and theoretical approaches to
education.
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Chapter 3
Posthuman Classrooms
This chapter will consider the writing classroom as a possible point of
contact between posthumanism and the academy. Specifically, it will look at the
teaching of technical writing as a promising area in which to have students
question the role of writing in the shaping of identity and in the maintenance of
networked community. Technical documents promise to help us control the many
anxieties associated with posthumanism; they promise to ease the everyday
frustrations of modern life through technology (even if these problems are
themselves introduced by technology). I am sure, for instance, that the SONY
corporation spent good money to hire a team of technical writers to write the
manual that came with my DVD player. I am sure, also, that my reading the
manual should allow me to acquire the necessary skill to make my DVD player
stop flashing “12:00,” as it has for the past several years. But ignoring such
instruction is, as Nietzsche might say, all too human.
While we do often encounter technical documents in the context of home
technologies, the teaching of technical writing is most often set in the broader
context of electronic literacy in the workplace (Sullivan and Dautermann). In other
words, the common assumption is that learning to write technical documents is
part of joining corporate culture. Thus, students tend to view technical writing as
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a practical subject valuable to reaching their professional goals. This is related to
the significance of the computer in, and the textual bias of, what is variously
called the “information society, knowledge society, or network society” (Tynjala et
al 74).
But while it may be true, as former secretary of labor Robert Reich writes,
that modern workers “when not conversing with their teammates . . . sit before
computer terminals,” computers have also become central elements of non-work
activities such as video gaming (208). The 2006 PS3 game system from Sony
was promoted as a “supercomputer for computer entertainment” that could serve
as the hub of a household’s multimedia needs, with about twenty times the
computing power of the typical PC (Hermida). Increasingly, games are not
restricted to the realm of leisure. At Dartmouth college, the installation of a
campus-wide wireless network not only allows students to stay in constant
communication, but allows teachers to integrate game show-type exercises into
their courses which students participate in using their laptops. The U.S. military
and many corporations now use games to train their employees cheaply and
effectively, and to identify and attract potential employees.
Despite the message sent by a number of reports from the National
Commission on Writing showing that writing ability is a critical capacity for
members of the academy, the workplace, and the government, technical writers
get little respect in the modern world. In Writing a Professional Life, a collection
of narratives written by working technical writers, we find that they are sometimes
called “glorified typists” and managers and coworkers glibly dispense comments
68

such as “You can write standards, but no one is going to use them,” and “Don’t
worry about it . . . Nobody reads manuals anyway” (Potts 24; Lee 46; Jong 124).
Or technical writers are flatly told that “[d]ocumentation is a formality. Users don't
read the documentation” (Staley 105). My own experiences as a technical writer
aren’t much different. On many occasions, colleagues were politely dismissive
towards my work, and in some cases, they were quite mean about the
uselessness of my field. Some years back, I did some grant writing for a mental
health research institute. I worked next door to a very nice man whose job it was
to collect statistics about suicides in the United States; even he told me that he
thought my job wasn’t very pleasant and certainly not very useful.
Popular culture isn’t kind to technical writers either. Tina the technical
writer from the Dilbert comic strips is described as being so demeaned that she
“believes that any conversation within hearing distance is intended as an insult to
her profession and her gender. She strives to maintain her dignity while
surrounded by engineers who don't have a proper respect for her work” (“The
Characters”). Technical writers are often represented as an underclass of
dehumanized laborers.
In the 2002 James Bond film, Die Another Day, Bond is handed a
technical manual for his new tricked-out spy car. After being told by Q, the
gadget master, that he could probably “shoot through [the manual] in a couple of
hours,” Bond immediately throws the manual into the sights of the car’s targetseeking shotguns, which promptly convert the manual into a shower of paper
scraps.
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There is hope for technical writers outside of comic strips and international
spying in the fast-developing realm of gaming. In the context of online gaming,
technical writing is the lingua franca of achievement and admiration. The
distributed communities of online games use technical writing to establish a
sense of community, and community members use technical writing to establish
their positions within these groups. In such a setting, cyborgs are welcome; their
“[i]ntense pleasure in skill, machine skill, ceases to be a sin, but an aspect of
embodiment” (Haraway 83). The chapter below will explore how video games
and the composition of technical documents provide insight into the construction
of posthuman community.

Gaming the Classroom
Can video games be integrated into technical writing classes? The easy
answer is: of course, it is entirely possible to have students compose traditional
technical genres that focus on video games. Certainly, students could write
proposals for new games, compose recommendation reports on which recently
released games to buy, create white papers on legal or ethical issues concerning
video games, generate informational reports on technical topics related to
gaming hardware and software, and assemble user documentation that covers
subjects such as game installation, mechanics, or strategy. Assigning user
documentation is eased by the abundance of Flash-based games on the web
and the distribution of gamer-created content for mainstream games, both of
which present freely accessible gaming material that is often not well70

documented. New games and steady changes in underlying technologies provide
an extensive source of technical information in need of analysis and description,
and the constant influx of new gamers supplies writers with an interested
audience that, if past trends continue, will only grow.
The promise of video games in the classroom is not that they can deliver
traditional content in digital packaging. Treating video games simply as the
potential content of technical writing ignores the experiences of gamers, in the
words of James Paul Gee in What Video Games Have to Teach Us About
Learning and Literacy, as cyborg “learners (players) embedded in a material and
social world” (7).
Kurt Squire argues that using video games is more than an opportunity to
update the delivery of traditional material. Rather, video games can offer
“designed experiences, in which participants learn through a grammar of doing
and being” (19). Video games that allow students to learn through “doing and
being,” as Shaffer, Squire, Halverson, & Gee suggest in their collaborative article,
ideally combine the best of educational theory and praxis, engaging players in
activities that help them “learn by integrating thinking, social interaction, and
technology, all in service of doing things they care about” (3). Those interested in
games and education, including those interested in making video games a part of
technical writing curricula, must therefore shift from the “question of ‘delivering
content’ to one of ‘designing experience’” (Squire 20). So, does this mean that
technical writing instructors must await the appearance of a technical writing
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simulation? Not at all. Current video games already provide situations in which
being a successful gamer entails doing technical writing.2
Educators are now beginning to realize the potential for sophisticated
learning within the social contexts of video games due not only to an
epistemological correspondence between technical writing and video games, but
because the experience of being a gamer always goes beyond the screen,
engaging individuals in social practices mediated by texts that are predominantly
written by gamers themselves. Viewing technical writing as a social practice is
not a new idea. Teachers of technical writing have long turned toward the
workplace to provide the social contexts in which the production of technical
genres can be studied, and to provide the cases through which technical writing
is often taught. The posthuman classroom is, ironically, not necessarily within the
institution at all. The networking common to the posthuman makes it possible for
learning to occur in many locations, and with varying degrees of intervention by
teachers and peers. We will therefore look to the practices of gaming
communities, in particular the experiences of those gamers involved in the
persistent three-dimensional online environments known as MMORPGs
(massively multiplayer online role-playing games) to understand how video
games call upon gamers to become posthuman technical writers.

Writing as Gaming
Some have already tried to imagine how new video games might be
designed to teach writing directly. As part of their September 2006 issue,
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Harper’s Magazine arranged a discussion among “four experts—two video-game
enthusiasts and two teachers—and charged them with a task: to dream up video
games that might teach, of all things, writing” (“Grand” 31).3 The impetus for such
a meeting was sound; while many pedagogical projects in fields such as
engineering, history, biology, architecture, and medicine have successfully
integrated video games into curricula, the teaching of writing through video
games has yet to be seriously pursued. In order to harness the educational
potential in video games for the teaching of writing, such conversations need to
occur between game designers and educators, and Harper’s can be commended
for initiating such a discussion. But from the perspective of someone interested in
the teaching of technical writing as a social practice, the results of the
conversation published in Harper’s are disappointing.
The group began by discussing the possibility of using video games to
teach the “rote elements of writing—grammar, punctuation, and spelling,” and
later to teach the “logical, consequential thinking” of argument, narrative
emplotment, and the development of literary characters (“Grand” 32). In the
games these individuals imagine, players shoot zombies bearing misspelled
words, manage a narrative in a literary version of SimCity, and write in a wiki (an
online collaborative writing space). None of these suggestions address writing as
a practice situated in communities (or even as part of a rhetorical situation). In
fact, only the wiki idea includes interaction with other individuals as part of the
process at all, but in this case the interaction is a function of the technology
rather than part of the purposes or motives of those using it.
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Such approaches, in which students write to no person for no reason, hold
little credence in modern composition theory and pedagogy. Having reduced
writing instruction to the teaching of a set of narrow skills, it’s no wonder one of
the speakers in the Harper’s group doubts whether such lessons will be useful in
“the real world” (“Grand” 34, 35). For their model to succeed, these skills must
transfer to real writing situations, but real writing situations are never imagined as
sites of education. Such a proposal refuses to take advantage of the posthuman
networks in which gamers and gaming discourse already circulate. It projects the
model of the academic classroom (and its purposeless writing) into cyberspace
without considering the very real writing that might be coming out of cyberspace.
The only reference to a real situation is when one of the teachers, Jane
Avrich, wonders whether a game could “include real reading,” for instance, by
having players “read literary texts and answer questions about them” (“Grand”
38). In this game (which sounds a lot like a reading quiz), answering increasingly
difficult questions would, Avrich claims, produce “[t]he text, a unique story
determined by the player, [which] would ultimately lead you to the goal of your
quest: the secret scrolls of Atlantis, for example, or the buried wing of the library
of Alexandria.” Another speaker generously calls this proposed game “an
exercise in a form of literacy.” One might legitimately ask here: where’s the
writing? Playing this game produces a text only insofar as it embodies the tenet
of reader response theory in which every act of reading produces the text being
read.
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Granted, the fusion of reading and writing is a feature that early theorists
of hypertext such as George Landow found especially provocative, and such
technologies help us acknowledge the indeterminate nature of texts as social
artifacts. But the belief that navigating hypertext (or answering questions about
literary texts) equals instruction in writing is difficult to reconcile to the awareness
that “language and texts . . . are essentially social activities, dependent on social
structures and processes not only in their interpretive but also in their
constructive phases” (Cooper 366). In order to understand the role of technical
writing in gaming communities, it makes sense to turn towards an approach to
writing that recognizes the construction of texts as a complex social process:
activity theory.
Activity theory draws upon the work of such theorists as Charles
Bazerman, Paul Prior, and David Russell, to investigate how texts and textual
practices are (re)produced in social settings. Based on the psychological theories
of Lev Vygotsky, activity theory looks at writing as always occurring within
“activity systems”—the complex ecologies of meaning and method sustained by
communities of practice. These systems are composed of “goal-directed,
historically-situated, cooperative human interactions” within communities where
writing processes constitute a “complex literate activity that includes reading and
writing, feeling and thinking, speaking and listening, observing and acting”
(Russell, “Implications” 53; Bazerman and Prior 7).
The move towards posthumanism has only deepened the complexities of
these writing communities. Grounding writing instruction in activity theory calls on
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students to understand writing through the “practices that people engage in to
produce texts as well as the ways that writing practices gain their meanings and
functions as dynamic elements of specific cultural settings” (Bazerman and Prior
2). Thus, when the Harper’s speaker suggests a video game based on the
“difficult, detailed, and arcane” minutiae of literary analysis, it is possible to see
this as trying to create a game that engages players in some of the communal
practices centered on the recurring situations experienced within a certain activity
system—that which includes English professors. For this community, “everything
from the basic rules of grammar to the obscure etymology of words” serves as
some of the tools employed in certain types of academic writing (“Grand” 38).
But activity theorists maintain that writing as a member of a community
must necessarily be more than the interaction between an individual and an
object of study using prescribed and approved methods. It requires engagement
with other community members; “organizations as well as individuals have writing
processes,” and it is only within these communal practices that one can see “how
writing works and [how] people work with writing” (Russell, “Process” 81). The
Harper’s literary-reading game could become a game about writing if it enabled
interaction among new and experienced players, for instance, in the form of
discussion and debate over the interpretive choices being made, the methods
enacted to reach those interpretations, and even the very rules of the game. This
would situate the desired literary reading techniques within the social context of a
community of practice. Whether gamers would find this enjoyable, however, is
another issue.
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Texting a Quest
King’s Quest, a long-running series of graphic adventure games published
by Sierra Online, places the gamer in the role of Sir Graham—knight, hero, and,
by the second game, king. But another role that players of these games adopt is
that of technical writer. The first installment of King’s Quest was released in 1984
for the IBM PCjr computer system. It was the first 3-dimensional computer game
where the player controlled a character on the screen in third-person mode.
Moving this character was accomplished using the keypad, and actions were
performed by typing simple commands, such as “eat mushroom” or “open door”
into an on-screen text box.
In a sense, gamers playing King’s Quest I learned to write the short,
imperative sentences common to technical documents such as instructions, and
each time they hit “enter” after typing an instruction, a usability test of their
instruction was played out on the screen in front of them—if their instruction was
successful, their character took the desired action. While such indirect education
was common, the documentation that came with these games sometimes took
encouragement of technical writing a step further. The majority of the King’s
Quest II manual was concerned with the background narrative of the player’s
character and the fictional kingdom of Daventry, and the island of Kolyma on
which the player finds herself at the beginning of the game. But two pages spoke
directly to the reader as gamer. The first page gave general advice such as
“leave no stone unturned” and “collect as many treasures as you can” (Sierra
10). The next page contained the following text:
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MAP YOUR PROGRESS
You and King Graham will not be able to fulfill the prophecy without
mapping your progress. Draw a map showing what different directions
lead where, objects found, dangerous areas—any and every landmark
you see along the way. And don’t think that because you’ve been through
an area once, that it will always be the same. The population of Kolyma is
anything but stationary.
Here’s a typical map:
[flowchart-style map of connected ovals with text annotations]
Above all, try every direction and map all of the different possibilities. If
you miss or forget an area, you might miss an important clue or a tool
necessary to the completion of your quest. (Sierra 11)
Here, the gamer is encouraged to become a maker of maps, a genre that is
mostly ignored in technical writing textbooks, but which is highly valued in
gaming communities. In fact, one young gamer took this encouragement
seriously. Below is a map created while playing King’s Quest II:
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Figure 1. Gamer-produced map for King’s Quest II. (Mason “Map”)

This map does not look much like the example provided in the manual, which is a
flowchart with text-filled ovals connected by lines and arrows, with no
representative graphics. It is quite possible that the flowchart-style map shown in
the King’s Quest manual fit the practices of the communities with which the game
designers were familiar—that of the business world, for instance—or the
practices of the community from which the game emerged—that of the game
designer(s) laying out a world whose visual appearance and topography were
still in the process of being imagined.4 The designers could build this world by
naming the locations and, literally, drawing the connections between the various
scenes. Their map would include no graphics because such details would be
decided later in the process, quite possibly by other individuals.
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The map above, on the other hand, emerged from the author’s experience
as a solitary gamer moving from screen to screen in a world already fully
illustrated. It is hard to see, at first, how such a map produced for personal use in
playing a non-collaborative game could point to the posthuman. After all, the
game designers took as their model of perception the human being, providing a
ground-level view of the digital world, a choice reproduced in the third-person
perspective of the map’s graphics (as opposed to the straight-down aerial
perspective, or the “bird’s-eye” view, of conventional maps).
Laurie Taylor has claimed that video games are “experiential spaces
generated through code and the player’s interaction with the execution of that
code through the medium of the screen” (“When” para. 1). The design of the map
above does draw attention to the “medium of the screen,” as it is formatted in a
grid, much like a series of individual screenshots. But it is important to note that
the character that the gamer played in this game (Sir Graham) never adopted
this perspective himself; rather, he walked across the screen as an avatar under
the player’s command, without his own three-dimensional perspective (which had
been available in video games since the mid-1970s). Already, we can see that
the representation of space in the game is at once impossible without the user
entering into a cognitive circuit with the screen in which what is seen is seen from
the gamer’s perspective.
The design choices are not merely personal, however. The map’s visual
conventions reinforce the importance of the goal provided by the manual to
“collect as many treasures as you can”: the name of every treasure on the map is
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enclosed in its own rectangular box. While the author’s map attests to the fact
that the medium of the screen is just one element in a broader context of literacy
activities invoked through the playing of games, it is important to remember that
this map was produced for personal use, with the limited goal of completing the
game, and so did not enter into the discourse of a broader gaming community.
Modern MMORPGs are built around communities of gamers that produce and
share such documents, and therefore these documents will be subject to the
standards and purposes of the communities from which they emerge, purposes
much more diverse than simply “the completion of your quest.” A short list of the
genres that gamers value and/or produce includes the following:
•

Guidebooks – depending on the game and purpose, may focus on
combat strategy, level advancement, trade skills, or other non-combat
activities such as group management or conflict resolution

•

Technical Descriptions – of in-game items/quests/characters; often
found in online databases of game information; especially valued when
describing a new discovery

•

Policies – written to manage the recurring action of social groups, such
as how one becomes a member of a specific gaming guild, or how loot is
divided among group members

•

Forums – online discussion boards on which players debate issues, post
announcements, and coordinate with other gamers; increasingly, game
developers often track user opinions via forums or solicit suggestions
directly
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•

Tutorials – instructions on how to accomplish various in-game tasks;
often text-based, accompanied by screenshots, although some online
sites host tutorials gamers have created by taking screen movies of
themselves performing specific actions within the game combined with
an instructional voice-over

•

FAQs – Frequently Asked Questions sections are staples of online sites
providing introductory information to novice players

•

Screenshots – gamers often compose screenshots to prove that they
have reached a special destination in a game, defeated a specific
opponent, or otherwise to commemorate in-game events; it is also
common for online communities to gather for in-game group photos that
would be difficult to coordinate face-to-face

•

Maps – portraying a range of sites and phenomena; many MMORPGs
take place in vast worlds that are difficult for new players to navigate,
and in which the geographic resources and dangers are not obvious

•

Reviews – of new games or game expansions, or in response to
changes made in the underlying game code

•

Walkthroughs – step-by-step procedures for completing a game; more
commonly created for linear games with definite end points than for
open-ended MMORPGs

•

End User Licensing Agreements – contracts that define the user’s legal
rights within the commercial game5
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•

Mods – user-created modifications of the game; in some games, these
could be anything from new boards to objects, avatars, skins (new
graphics overlaid onto pre-existing game objects), or updates to the
game engine itself

Narrative makes no explicit appearance above. But it is important to remember,
as John Seely Brown has explained in his article, “Growing Up Digital,” that
technical communities (in Seely’s article, tech reps for Xerox) depend heavily on
storytelling to supplement or even replace traditional technical documents such
as manuals as sources of technical information.6 There’s no reason to believe
that the stories shared by gamers in-game and in online forums do not perform
similar functions. This list does not attempt to address all the different texts that
gamers produce, nor does it attempt to investigate how the value of these realworld documents may be related to the in-game roles of texts as valuable game
objectives and equipment (recall the suggestion in Harper’s that gamers might
seek “the secret scrolls of Atlantis, or the buried wing of the library of
Alexandria”).7 What this list does provide is a sense of the range of both
traditional and hybrid genres that gamers employ to mediate their social gaming
activities. While some gamers make use of insider information about games
provided by other players, referring to them as cheats, this is just one of the
ethical issues raised by the posthuman characteristics of distributed cognition, in
which it is easy to find out what other gamers already know.
While students don’t often associate writing with play, it’s also true that
many gamers come to see their play as work. As Nick Yee concludes, “many
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players in fact characterize their game play as a second job,” repeating within the
game the same types of “clerical tasks, logistical planning, and management”
activities that they perform at work (69). It’s unsurprising, then, to find that the
writing genres that gamers create in the process of playing games are
comparable to those found in other technical communities. For activity theorists,
genre is a key concept in writing instruction because genres embody the
standard forms and processes of communication within a community of practice.
They are the “recognizable, self-reinforcing forms of communication” that
emerge to address the shared common purposes and situations that members of
a community often face (Bazerman, “Speech” 316). Without these shared and
recurring experiences and the genres that emerge to address them, there is no
need for enculturation in communal writing practices. And if, as Bazerman
argues, genres of writing are “continuing realizations of social activity within
socially structured situations,” that is, if they always carry the mark of their
“historical, social moment,” then teachers should be able to use the writing of
gamers within gaming communities to provide students insight into the
contemporary practices of technical communication (Shaping 128, emphasis
added, 5).

Guilding the Writer
“‘Experience,’ said Holmes, laughing. ‘Indirectly it may be of value, you know;
you have only to put it into words to gain the reputation of being excellent
company for the remainder of your existence.’”
– Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Adventures of Sherlock Holmes
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Tom Malone has shown how games tap into players’ curiosity, fantasy,
and need for challenge and control to create what he calls “intrinsically
motivating” environments (333). The role of motivation in getting humans to
produce discourse is not an afterthought in posthumanism, as Deleuze’s and
Guattari’s use of “desiring machines” evidences. Arguably, players in MMORPG
environments, by plugging into the machine that is the game, are motivated to
collaborate. As Brad McQuaid, one of the designers of the game EverQuest (EQ)
has stated, “By creating an environment often too challenging for a solo player,
people are compelled to group and even to form large guilds and alliances. All of
this builds community, and it all keeps players coming back for more and more”
(Qtd. in Jakobsson and Taylor 88).
By becoming members of a guild, players stake their position as nodes in
a virtual network of knowledge. They contribute to the larger success of their
guild through the accumulation of group capital, even as they advance as
individuals. This play of plurality and singularity makes every guild to be a
multitude in the sense forwarded by Hardt and Negri. The ability of players to
switch among multiple avatars, each with distinct possessions and abilities
makes these “whatever” communities in the sense forwarded by Agamben.
Bodies are not devalued, however. As anyone who’s played EQ knows, one’s
body in the game is a valuable commodity. Dying strands your body, often in
inconvenient places, and a player must often enlist the help of others to reclaim it
before it disappears from the game, taking with the all the functionality and
capital embedded in the prostheses it was carrying at the time of death.
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The collaborative nature of such game play is not only necessary for the
accumulation of material capital embodied in durable commodities that can be
traded both in and outside the game (in-game currency, or components for
crafting items in-game, for example), it also facilitates the accumulation of the
various social and cultural capital that gamers create through their participation in
social networks. Thomas Malaby has explored the many types of capital that
gamers generate, working from Pierre Bourdieu’s account of the “economy of
practices” in order to show how “human practice over time accumulates in
different forms . . . the congealed labor of commodities, the lasting obligations of
social networks, or the established cultural practices of taste” (147). What Malaby
does not address is the role that writing serves in the production of this capital.
Sherlock Holmes had Watson, his faithful chronicler, to put his exploits
into words. Gamers have themselves. Social capital is a valuable resource in
MMORPGs, especially as gamers join groups (known as “guilds” in EQ) and
advance to higher levels. As Jakobsson and Taylor write, “a character might be
quite powerful in terms of experience level, [but] they also need social capital to
draw on to progress to the true high-end game” (86). They further state that
guilds, by solving previously unsolved puzzles, or figuring out how to defeat
difficult new creatures, are able to “actually contribute to the broader collective
knowledge of the game.” Guilds thus qualify as a “pool of people eligible for
rewards accruing from the production” of knowledge about the game world they
inhabit (Longo 2). As Bernadette Longo explains in her book, Spurious Coin: A
History of Science, Management, and Technical Writing, “technical writing is the
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apparatus for assigning credit and value” for the production of such knowledge
(2). By becoming technical writers, gamers are able to manage their
accumulation of social capital.
Jakobsson and Taylor also claim that although gamers are “creators of
their gaming experience. . . . there is actually very little freedom for any given
player to affect the larger social structure” and thus the “specific contribution of
any single player is almost never visible” (89). While this may be true in terms of
changes made to the overall social structure of the game, it does not apply to the
production of knowledge about these games at the micro-level, the majority of
which is credited to the individuals who collect and publish such information.
There are many online sites that enable gamers to gain credit by sharing the
knowledge they have accumulated through play. The web site Allakhazam's
Magical Realm (everquest.allakhazam.com), for instance, is an online database
of information about EQ. All of the information about the gaming worlds is
attributed to the individual gamers who submit it, who gain the title of “scholar,”
“sage” or “guru” for their unpaid efforts.
Let’s consider a gamer known online as Friedrich Psitalon, a contributor to
Allakhazam's Magical Realm and sites like it. Friedrich frequently uploaded
images and descriptions of items to online databases like Allakhazam’s Magical
Realm, but these were not Friedrich’s only venue for spreading technical
knowledge about the game. At the time, Friedrich was guild master of the PovarTarew Artisans (PTA), an EQ guild dedicated to the mastery of trades (in EQ,
players can practice a trade, becoming, for instance, a tailor, smith, cook,
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jeweler, or alchemist). The PTA created a web site to manage their guild, a place
where anyone could access the collective wisdom of their guild members.8 Their
site hosted a “library” containing such documents as “Sojiba's Guide to Potions,”
“Wrin's Guide to Baking,” “Yoan's Guide to Brewing,” “Doompety's Guide to
Tinkering,” and “Friedrich’s Guide to Making Things That Shine” (i.e. jewelry)—all
technical documents written by guild members and attributed to them using their
in-game character names. The site also contained documents intended to
mediate guild activities such as news and announcements, their guild charter, a
code of ethics, policies for advancing within the guild, and rules for conducting
guild activities such as the in-game bazaars where they sold their crafts. Overall,
the guild used technical documents to sustain and organize their online
community, as well as gain prestige in the eyes of other gamers by sharing their
collective knowledge.
Through his guild membership and community participation both in and
out of the game, Friedrich maintained a reputation as one of those individuals
who “know the [community’s] specialized language and can turn this knowledge
into specialized practices,” thus becoming “eligible for the power, influence, and
funding that accrue from this knowledge” (Longo 3). Some evidence of the
usefulness of such capital is that Friedrich was able to parlay his experience as
an EQ guild master, as an active contributor to online gaming forums, and as an
amateur competitive gamer into a position as a production assistant for Firaxis
Games. Firaxis Games is a video game development company best known for its
Civilization games, a series of award-winning historical simulation and strategy
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games in which you build an empire through ancient times to the modern age
and beyond.
Once established as an in-house authority, Friedrich was asked to coauthor (under his real name) the Brady Games official strategy guide for the most
recent Civilization game. Such translations of “experience in the virtual world into
success in the real one,” Brown and Thomas write, are “bound to become more
common as the gaming audience explodes and gameplay becomes more
sophisticated.” They call such educational experiences “accidental learning” that
favors “learning to be—a natural byproduct of adjusting to a new culture—as
opposed to learning about.” While many are willing to admit the considerable
amount of learning that takes place in gaming, and the importance of networking
in the development of marketable skills, the role that writing plays in such
experiential learning remains largely unrecognized.

Gaming as Productive Social Practice
At a time when online gaming industry revenues are overshadowing more
traditional entertainment options, when corporate, military, and private interests
are actively pursuing their agendas through the development of interactive
games, and when both children and adults are spending an increasing amount of
their lives developing online identities and interacting socially with other gamers,
it is unsurprising to learn that a host of academic and non-academic initiatives,
centers, groups, and conferences has emerged to understand (and influence)
how games affect literacy and learning. For instance, in a 2004 white paper
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entitled “Video Games and the Future of Learning,” educators from the University
of Wisconsin-Madison’s Academic Advanced Distributed Learning Co-Laboratory
argued that video games “have the potential to change the landscape of
education as we know it,” because they are “not just about facts or isolated skills,
but embody particular social practices” (Shaffer et al. 2).
I’d like to think that it is not such a revolutionary idea that education is “not
just about facts or isolated skills.” At the least, I don’t believe such an insight will
revolutionize the teaching of writing. Over half a century ago, in his 1953
dissertation, Albert Kitzhaber called on teachers to stop teaching writing through
the “modes” (traditionally defined as narration, description, exposition and
argument) which he believed provided an “unrealistic view of the writing process”
and, rather, to understand writing as a “meaningful act of communication in a
social context” (139, emphasis added). Almost a quarter century ago, Marilyn
Cooper proposed an “ecological model of writing, whose fundamental tenet is
that writing is an activity through which a person is continually engaged with a
variety of socially constituted systems” (367). She was building on the work of
previous scholars who had resisted the view of writing as merely a set of
cognitive processes, scholars who had concluded instead that writing “cannot be
artificially separated from the social-rhetorical situations in which writing gets
done, from the conditions that enable writers to do what they do, and from the
motives writers have for doing what they do” (Qtd. in Cooper 367). Today, the
role of the social in writing practices is considered fundamental to writing
instruction.
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With a strong record of understanding writing through social ecologies,
writing teachers are well prepared to understand the role of language and writing
in the dynamic, free-form interactions that characterize modern MMORPGs, to
take advantage of the access that the Internet provides to the documents of
online gaming communities, and to perceive how the in-game and out-of-game
activities of these communities constitute “dynamic interlocking systems which
structure the social activity of writing” (Cooper 368). Such work can illuminate the
contours of posthuman learning and challenge the “axiomatic assumption that
games are by definition ‘unproductive,’” by drawing attention to the texts
produced by gamers to mediate social interactions (Pearce 17). If it is true that
the production and circulation of technical genres is a feature of successful
gaming communities, then participation in these games is one way to offer
students access to a social context in which technical writing matters.
When video games first emerged, their simplicity carried over to their
instructions. Pong, the first coin-op arcade game to gain widespread attention,
simply stated “Avoid missing ball for high score” (Cohen 37). For other early
games, game developers could produce short manuals that included descriptions
of all the characters, locations, and items that a player would encounter while
playing the game. But with MMORPGs such as EQ boasting over 50,000 unique
items, and constantly adding them, it’s easy to see why manuals for these games
would avoid the traditional role of describing game content. The scale of modern
video games thus produces an environment that encourages the types of activity
pointed out by Raph Koster, a video game designer speaking in the Harper’s
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forum, when he noted that “Lots of players have written their own game guides”
(“Grand” 34).
The open-ended nature of MMORPGs and the socially-constructed norms
of gaming communities ensure that “there is a wide gap between how the game
is described through the official channels, such as in the manual, and how it is
actually played” (Jakobsson and Taylor 89). The technical genres created by
gamers serve as what Carolyn Miller has called “genres of social action”—genres
that reveal the “typified rhetorical actions based in [the] recurrent situations” that
members of a community face (159).9 The manuals created by game
development companies typically do not address these recurrent situations, a
circumstance that leads gamers to produce their own texts. While it may be true,
as one gamer writes, that “most gamers (including me) prefer to skip the guide,
install the game, and learn by doing,” this dismissal of guidebooks is usually
limited only to official game manuals that are packaged with the game when you
buy it (Jimpy).
That MMORPGs are “fairly free-form, without any specific goal that you
have to reach” turns the games into a process of discovery in which the gamer
must explore the world, collect information, investigate possibilities, and engage
in problem-solving to advance, often with the help of other gamers (“Grand” 34).
As they gain expertise about the game world and how to succeed in it, players
can create “guides [that] synthesize all that knowledge, translate it into prose,
make it intelligible to other people” (“Grand” 35). Such guides are found not only
freely distributed, but for sale as well. It is telling that one of the Harper’s
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speakers responds to the suggestion that gamers could create game guides by
asking whether gamers would be “able to abstract this knowledge out of the
gaming world and into the real world?” What this speaker fails to see is that, in
producing these guides for consumption by other players, gamers have already
abstracted knowledge out of the gaming world into the real world using the skills
it takes to write, organize, and, sometimes, to market their texts. In truth, active
participation in gaming communities demands proficiency in “a range of (primarily
written) social practices, eliciting an enormous amount of reading, writing,
research, and argumentation,” the very skills the Harper’s group appears to be
interested in (Squire 23).
That gamers are willing to put great effort into the production of texts that
they then distribute outside of the games they play should not be surprising. As
Bazerman has recognized, the learning, attention, and development of
individuals are “closely tied to what they find (or can be convinced is) real and
engaging, even if at certain moments play is what strikes them as most real”
(“Editor’s” ix). Posthumanism dissolves the boundaries between the real and the
virtual, between the simulation and the simulated. Certainly, the fact that some
individuals have made careers out of playing video games (both as competitive
players and as online merchants selling in-game items for actual money)
suggests that there is more reality here than often presumed.10
Though often devalued as mere play, video games are significant sites of
literacy. In a study of the literacy activities of preadolescent African American
males interested in basketball, Jabari Mahiri noted that these youth, though
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selective in their reading interests, “eagerly devoured 20- to 30-page video game
manuals describing the rules and strategies for playing computer basketball and
other computer sports games” (310). Part of the educational value of video
gaming comes from how motivated gamers are to become successful members
in gaming communities. In some cases, such occasions lead to an individual’s
first serious engagement with technical genres, or with activities common in
technical communities such as usability testing.11
The link between video games, learning, and technical communication
rests partly on a common epistemology. The traditional goals of technical
communication are, as Mike Markel has written, to help readers “learn something
or carry out a task” (5). The basic assumption is that readers of technical writing
primarily read for the purpose of enabling a specific action. After all, few people
peruse a phonebook just for fun. Technical genres are thus often viewed as
“functional documents” that focus on a “human agent performing actions in a
particularized situation” (Flower, Hayes, and Swarts 42). Squire has argued that
video games are designed according to a “functional epistemology . . . [where
the] player’s actions are his or her interface with the world” (22).
Whether casting spells, swinging swords, drinking potions, or practicing
trade skills, players of EQ survive and advance through their in-game actions.
Surely, players are motivated by the desire for fun; but in order to have fun in the
game, players must acquire the technical knowledge necessary to perform
actions successfully in the game world. These actions are the “building blocks by
which players become action heroes, civilization leaders, or L.A. gangsters”
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(Squire 22). This “grammar of doing and being” within video games parallels the
functional epistemology of technical writing (Squire 19). Since most MMORPGs
reward players for continued play by granting them new abilities, it is easy to see
how gamers can conflate fun with the ability to do (more and better) things.12
Gamers also reinforce the functional link between technical documents
and video games by viewing these documents as tools that enable future action
in the game by providing accurate information. Such attitudes position the
“technical writer in a quite orthodox, classical world” where writing “functions best
when it functions as a conduit for verifiable, technical information” (Neel 23). As
one online gaming site promises, “we try our best to keep the information here as
accurate and up to date as possible” (“About EQTC”). But many scholars have
shown how technical writing is anything but “a transparent conveyor of neutral,
objective facts” with accuracy as its sole measure (Bushnell 179). So, the above
should not be taken as an argument that technical documents created by gamers
are, or should be, merely functional documents. Technical writing is entirely
rhetorical, and its production is shot through with ethical and political issues
attendant to the social construction of meaning through language.
The recognition of the functional relationship between video games and
technical writing shouldn’t be allowed to undermine the critical aims of sociallybased pedagogies. Educators can encourage students to look closely at the
social activities of gaming communities (and not just the game itself) in order to
understand how technical writing participates in what Longo calls “historically
situated institutions of relationships of knowledge and power—how some types of
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knowledge are valued and legitimated through technical writing practices, while
other possible knowledges are devalued or excluded as marginal” (12). Without
such inquiry, technical writing is reduced to its positivistic and functional aspects.
But without the close attention to the social interactions of communities that
approaches such as activity theory call for, including recognition of the functional
objectives of many gamers, such inquiry is impossible.

Writing(:) the Future of Video Games in Education
“But will computers change the way we learn? We answer: Yes.
Computers are already changing the way we learn—and if you want to
understand how, look at video games. Look at video games, . . . .
Look at video games . . . . Look at video games . . . .”
–Shaffer et al., “Video Games and the Future of Learning”
Video games are a convenient touchstone for the changing nature of
education. Already, university classes are being held, not just online, but within
online gaming worlds such as Second Life—a three-dimensional virtual world in
which “residents” have near-unlimited control, not just over the appearance of
their avatars, but over the mechanics of the game world itself. Online sites such
as the Apolyton University have emerged to satisfy gamers’ need for advanced
instruction in gameplay. Accredited bricks-and-mortar institutions such as the
DigiPen Institute of Technology now offer degrees in Real-Time Interactive
Simulation.13 The epigraph above repeatedly calls upon us to “look at video
games” as the site of understanding the potential of computer-mediated learning.
In order to understand the role of video games in learning, in particular the
learning of writing, we need to look beyond the games themselves to the
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activities of gaming communities, and to the documents that circulate throughout
the social contexts beyond the screen, and to these texts’ relation to the political
and ethical commitments of gamers within these communities.
With their long-term commitment to the “central role that communities play
in both writing and writing pedagogy,” writing teachers are well-positioned to take
advantage of the experiences that video games offer to facilitate writing
instruction. (Thralls and Blyler 250). If one accepts David Russell’s decree that
“All learning is situated within some activity system(s). One learns by
participating—directly or vicariously” in these system(s), then perhaps students
can learn technical writing through participation in the activity systems constituted
by video gaming (“Implications” 56). By looking at the activity systems in which
gamers write, we can better understand the practices and genres which form the
basis of gamers’ communicative practice, and we can also establish the
educational value of existing video games.
Such work recognizes that the networked classroom is not just a
classroom connected to the internet by wires, but a circuit made through bodies,
intentions, and affects. Taking our place as machines in the posthuman
university need not entail, and posthuman education does not necessarily mean
holding a class inside of virtual spaces such as Second Life. What matters is
critical attention to the way that education happens through our connections with
others by the virtue of our embodiment within networks of communication and
collaboration.
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Chapter 4
Posthuman Institutions
Much of the focus on posthumanism has been on its more technologized
features. Perhaps this is because non-human prosthesis are the most visible
and exciting characteristics of the posthuman age. Even more notable than the
visibility and excitement of technology, however, is the anxiety it brings. While it
is likely that the greatest anxiety is present in those individuals who have the
least familiarity with technology, even proponents of technologized culture often
cite some nagging concerns about the pervasiveness of machinery in realms
once reserved for humans alone.
Because of it’s visibility and the anxiety it inspires, coupled with everpresent and ongoing debates about the ethical dimensions of using more
advanced technology in various arenas, posthumanism is often wrongly defined
in terms of technology alone. However, any view of posthumanism that is limited
to the melding of human and machine is overly simplistic and fails to address the
other important aspects of posthumanism. Further, conceptualizing
posthumanism as effecting only individuals is a mistake. Posthumanism affects
cultures of people, specific communities, and institutions, as well as the
conventions governing action and power within those groups. In this chapter, I
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will look to the university to examine the ways in which posthumanism is shaping
institutional identities in the face of the knowledge economy.
The knowledge economy is characterized by a work environment where
individuals must cross-train across departmental and disciplinary boundaries,
communicate with individuals with a diversity of identities and areas of expertise,
and where individuals must be ready to master any number of technological tools
to succeed. To meet the needs of future workers in the knowledge economy, our
universities are adopting various strategies, such as the implementation of
service learning, to successfully adapt to the demands of posthumanism.
The American university in general, and the humanities specifically, is
struggling to make sense of its place in a culture shaped by fast capitalism,
oppositional politics, boutique multiculturalism, social hierarchies, free markets,
technological revolution, international conflict, and a host of other phenomena
that challenge the university as a site of traditional humanistic inquiry. At the
same time, these forces highlight the university’s more modern roles in the
knowledge economy as a credentialing service, gatekeeper, and commercial
incubator.
A commonplace view of popular versions of posthumanism features the
incorporation of technology into the body. Modern academic institutions have
embraced their roles as technology showcases, serving as environments in
which students test the limits of their comfort with new technologies. But we
rarely talk about the role of educational institutions in introducing students to this
process of incorporation in anything but positive terms, and thus have neglected
99

the ways in which the college curriculum mediates the anxiety associated with
losing one’s humanity and putting on a more technologized identity. How do
college curriculums, for instance, both enable students to see their bodies as
“incarnations of worldwide webs and global networks,” and reassure them of their
essential humanity (Taylor, Moment 17)?
I want to consider how the tension between humanistic inquiry and
posthumanistic incorporation to technological and technocratic systems has
shaped the college curriculum, and I argue in the following chapter that the rise
of service learning across many disciplines is a marker of the attempts by
colleges to position themselves within a humanistic tradition of seeking truth and
serving others, even as they participate in preparing students for posthuman
networks of distributed production and the modern reality of career-hopping and
consultation. Consider the description of one writer’s professional life:
You cannot call such meandering a career; it was more like a wind-up doll
moving along a crooked path by careening into walls. I have lost count,
but since 1965, I have had at least two dozen different employers and six
different episodes of self-employment. I spent twenty of those years as a
contractor, writing for hire on a project-by-project basis, as opposed to
being an employee in the business. As a contractor, I seldom saw a
project through to its conclusion. I was usually involved in another project
by the time the video was released, the manual was published, or the
presentation was made. (Kenney 157)
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Here is a prescient insight into the post-industrial reality of specialized labor
practices in which employees can be plugged in and out of the production cycle
as needed, never working on a product from start to finish. It is also a
representation of the posthuman workplace at the heart of the knowledge
economy, one with flattened structures where connection and collaboration are
more important than hierarchy, where job responsibilities are flexible, and where
employees are more likely to seek another job with higher pay than to get a raise
where they are. Such positions are now characterized by complex ecologies of
information that employees must continually filter, analyze, and translate.
The role of technology in enabling this filtering, analysis, and translation
has led to universities touting features such as their high-speed connections to
the internet backbone, as well as their number of wired classrooms, wi-fi hot
spots, and open-use computer labs. In most disciplines, the existence of
advanced technologies can determine the curriculum and the specializations with
which students can graduate. Even in the field of writing studies, most programs
that give advanced degrees in technical writing or web design have usability labs
on campus in which students use an array of recording devices to collect
feedback from the readers of their documents. Schools laud their integration of
blogs, podcasts, and wikis into their curriculum, and many have developed online
courses and developed partnerships to distribute content through iTunes and
other technology services. In their research programs, schools have worked hard
to develop centers in emerging and commercially viable areas such as
biotechnology, genetics, informatics, and military technologies. All of this
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beckons students with the promise of success in today’s technologically
advanced posthuman workplace.
Although it is easy to focus on the hard sciences as the site of the
uncritical embrace of technology, the role of technology in the humanities
demands a similar critique. In fact, William Spanos traces the tendency to ignore
the role of technology in the humanities back to Foucault’s application of the
base-superstructure model of classical Marxism, in which Foucault describes an
“unevenly developed discourse [which has] inadvertently reinscribed the false
opposition” between the sciences and the humanities (47). Rather, Spanos
claims that the humanities are just as complicit in the uncritical endorsement and
obfuscation of the posthuman condition. As he writes: scholars continue to
“identify the ‘regime of truth” with the scientific/technological/capitalist
establishment while minimizing the role that literature, philosophy, and the arts,
and the institutions that transmit their ‘truths,’ play.” This chapter, then, wants to
consider the ideological implications of perhaps one of the most sacred practices
of liberal education—service learning—and argue that its embrace is a response
to posthumanism that does not sufficiently critique its own objectives, and one
that allows the university to appease both humanistic and posthumanistic
compulsions. It is, in short, a marker of the university’s fractured and composite
identity.
At a time when several state legislatures and some universities are
considering the so-called “Academic Freedom Bill of Rights” (which attempts to
impose ideological balance upon academic classrooms), when conservative
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organizations are offering bounties for evidence of academic liberal bias, and
when web sites expose “radical” teachers and call for their dismissal, service
learning and the circulation of information about it might be seen as a defensive
strategy. By making the work of professors knowable, visible, and
comprehensible to the public, service learning eases apprehension about what
happens within classroom walls. This effort is aided by the human interest aspect
of service learning which encourages media coverage and is easily appropriated
for official university promotional efforts. The image of service learning in which
students contribute to the success of their communities as part of their college
education thus alleviates the anxiety that they are becoming dehumanized in
their quest for employment, status, and knowledge. Service learning assures the
public that students are not adopting the elitism associated with the ivory tower.
Service learning also plays well to the anti-intellectualism of modern
society. News articles perennially denounce the “esoteric shop talk” at academic
conferences like MLA. Service learning has the virtue, at least, of being easy to
understand. And the service performed for the community provides a
counterpoint to the common view of university professors as out-of-touch elites
protected from political, economic, and cultural forces. For many teachers, the
introduction of local service projects into curricula enhances students’
understanding of citizenship and community as it also enhances the
understanding of course content. For some like Donald Lazere, however, the
focus on local politics is disturbing, since he sees it as a political retreat. He
warns that “the limited aims of purely local activism signal a constriction in
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political consciousness that has grave consequences for the future of this
generation” (354). Likewise, service learning may also be a retreat from
posthumanism.
In general, academics are happy and willing to adopt service learning
pedagogies that place students in real-world situations. As we saw in the
previous chapter looking at the real-world activities of virtual gaming
communities, such contexts do promise to allow students a better understanding
of the situated nature of communication. But the broader reasons for the
widespread adoption of service learning are not merely pedagogical. They are
part of the process by which institutions are becoming posthuman.

Working through Posthumanism
What does it mean to work as a posthuman, and how do schools prepare
students for this work? Several recent texts have engaged with the idea of
working in network culture in an attempt to better understand the place of the
individual within what is now termed the age of “distributed work.” An entire
special issue of Technical Communication Quarterly was devoted to such work,
which editor Clay Spinuzzi defines as “coordinative, polycontextual, crossdisciplinary work that splices together divergent work activities (separated by
time, space, organization, and objectives) and that enables the transformations
of information and texts that characterize such work” (265). Melinda Turnley has
similarly described the demands of workers in posthuman workplaces as
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requiring interconnected sets of literacies that are “layered” to “combine basic,
rhetorical, social, technological, ethical, and critical skills” (104).
In the past, employees developed “vertical expertise,” where career
learning happened strictly within the boundaries of a particular discipline. Over
the course of a career, an individual would acquire more and more expertise and
experience in her field only (Engeström, Y., Engeström R., and Vähääho 346).
Advancement in this professional setting was based on a hierarchy in which the
knowledge needed as both worker and manager was well-established.
Posthuman environments characterized by distributed work demand a kind of
“horizontal expertise” where individuals learn across boundaries, across
“organizations, activities, disciplines, fields, trades, and settings” (Engeström, Y.,
Engeström, R., and Kärkkäinen 320). Service learning produces horizontal
expertise by asking students to cross the boundaries of the classroom and the
institution in order to work with community organizations and within community
organizations. In many cases, these organizations demand a range of skills of
the students, skills that go far beyond those typically assessed in any single
college course. This is not unlike the scenario addressed in the previous chapter,
in which video games call upon gamers to engage in a wide variety of literate
activities. Spinuzzi correctly notes that communicators in today’s technologically
saturated world must be “one part writer, one part project manager, one part
programmer, and one part student” (273).
My own experience with writing professionally reinforces this sense that to
be a contributing member of the new workforce and individual must wear many
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hats. Even when I was hired as a “technical writer,” I didn’t do just technical
writing. In total honesty, I don’t think the organizations that hired me could really
articulate what they needed me to do. They just knew they wanted something
done. Often, it is the work of the technical communicator to figure out what
needs to be done, how to get it done, and then to communicate some sort of
understanding to a number of audiences after actually doing whatever it was that
needed done. Technical writers are expected to be experts in technology,
whatever that technology may do, and for that reason they must be willing to
learn on the job and to assume any number of professional identities in order to
be successful (or perhaps, to simply justify their existence). Technical writers
must be skilled in communicating to everyone, as they are likely to come into
contact with others across disciplinary, organizational, and departmental
boundaries in their distributed work environments.
Working in a distributed work environment in our posthuman age,
technical writers aren’t limited to writing software manuals. They are designing
interfaces, managing workgroups, building databases, testing usability, marketing
identities, and editing multimedia. It is difficult for any single classroom to
reproduce the conditions of the posthuman workplace because the concerns of
most teachers seem, perhaps unfairly, to be relatively narrow. But experiences
such as service learning, by compelling students to satisfy the varied, and
sometimes unreasonable, demands of real clients, come close to what
professional writers experience every day.
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During their professional lives, students will have to meet the demands of
clients. Meeting the demands of clients may be a somewhat different task than
meeting the demands of the student’s discipline. In other words, some projects
may require students accomplish tasks for a client that might not have been a
focus of their academic studies. In order to meet the demands of clients,
students must use skills culled from multiple college courses (and sometimes
skills learned as needed during the project).
Because so many companies have flattened their organizational
structures, the range of skills required to be a contributing member of an
organization has broadened. While students will be required to master skills
outside of their disciplines, ironically, this post-disciplinary approach may serve to
make each discipline’s content more meaningful to students. As an article in a
recent Proceedings from the American Society for Engineering Education noted,
one reason engineering students fail to realize the importance of writing is that
communication is “often treated as a set of skills that students are supposed to
acquire outside of engineering” (2261). The authors argue that students need to
see the relation between their work in communications and their core coursework
and skill set, including problem solving, equations, modeling processes, and
product design. Composition theorists and writing teachers have known this for a
long time now—that effective writing instruction is grounded in authentic work
that calls on complex set of literacies. The practice of learning though
communication—especially communication within actual organizations—will
better enable our students to acquire both the vertical and horizontal expertise
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they will need to succeed in posthuman workplaces that demand distributed work
skills.
In some ways, the posthuman shift toward distributed work is facilitated by
our changing physical environments. In the late 60s, Robert Probst introduced
American offices to moveable, low-walled cubicles. The mobility of cubicles
reflected a new modular attitude towards work—cubicles, employees, and
information could all be added, moved, or removed very easily. Now, perhaps,
we are shifting towards office environments like the ones we see in commercials
for business credit cards, where employees crash on bean bag chairs behind
laptops, seated in a circle to share ideas. In other representations, giant dark
rooms fill with prone employees lying silent and “ideating.” The heavy oak
seminar desk has been replaced by a ping pong table. While this certainly isn’t
everywhere, it is definitely a trend, as evidenced by the offices of some very
visible and highly successful companies such as Google, RedBull, and Pixar.
These changing physical spaces facilitate working in new ways—sharing
ideas without heed to boundaries, working in group settings, working beyond job
titles, and of course, working in both virtual and material environments. In these
complex ecologies, each employee holds multiple roles, and is no longer
expected to perform only the responsibilities of his or her job title. In the age of
posthumanism, workers must perform what Spinuzzi calls “interpenetrated
work”—work that “involve(s) more communication, more and different types of
communication, and consequently more need for rhetorical analysis and
rhetorical skill” (266). The classroom is a poor proxy for the complex and
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unpredictable working conditions students may find themselves in after
graduation.
As a way for students to gain the type of identities and habits associated
with posthuman workplaces, service learning has served admirably, all the while
presenting itself as a humanistic endeavor focused on serving the needs of the
community. In other words, service learning is just one more machine into which
posthuman selves can plug themselves. It is a technology of self that produces
posthuman subjectivities primed for employment in posthuman systems. These
posthuman workplaces have been primarily formed, not by humanistic concerns,
but by economic and political forces. So, in the rest of this chapter, I want to pay
particular attention to how the same economic and political forces that have
shaped posthuman workplaces are affecting institutions of higher education as
well, and are driving the current popularity of service-learning pedagogies among
stakeholders committed to both humanistic and posthumanistic ideals.

The Service Machine
“It is not learning but the spirit of service that will give a college a place in the
annals of the nation.”
—Woodrow Wilson, Princeton in the Nation’s Service
“In order to maintain the use of this teaching tool and to keep it fresh and
productive, it is crucial for us to consider the dark side of the pedagogy and be
alert to situations that might create a negative experience for any involved.”
—Toni S. Whitfield, “The Dark Side of Service Learning”
When the term service learning first appeared in print in the U.S. in 1967
in the Southern Regional Education Board’s work to provide state leaders with
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resources for long-range education planning, many campuses already held a
strong commitment to the public good as part of their academic mission (Jacoby
12). Indeed, the academic commitment to public service has long received strong
support from students, administrators, and public policy. Scholars such as John
Dewey had laid the humanistic foundation for interest in service learning through
their support of experiential education in the first half of the twentieth century, as
did national policies such as the Morrill Act of 1862 which established U.S. landgrant institutions for the study of agricultural and mechanical arts. But it was not
until the 1960s, marked by the creation of the Peace Corps in 1961 and the
Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) program in 1965, that significant
interest developed in the U.S. in the educational value of service.
Today, service learning is used to refer to various forms of “experiential
education in which students engage in activities that address human and
community needs together with structured activities intentionally designed to
promote learning and development” (Jacoby 5). In the idealized grassroots
version of service learning, students in a chemistry class might test local water
bodies for certain chemicals and report their findings to government agencies
and advocacy groups, while students in a technical writing class might design a
web site for a non-profit organization. The less idealistic version of service
learning has much more in common with traditional entrepreneurial partnerships
between business and education. In all cases, the stated goal is to enhance
student learning while providing a service to the community. Despite the “periodic
mortality” of interest in it over the last forty years, service learning has achieved
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an increasingly stable position in higher education, especially since the mid
1980s (Zlotkowski 22). Membership in Campus Compact (2007)—a national
coalition of U.S. college and university presidents “committed to fulfilling the
public purposes of higher education” through initiatives such as service
learning—has grown from only 4 members in 1985 to now nearly 1,100 (“About”).
Once thought to be mainly the project of progressive educators influenced
by the civil rights and other social justice movements, service learning has
become institutionalized and professionalized internationally through a host of
specialized journals, conferences, associations, grant programs, textbooks,
seminars, book series, campus offices, and dedicated university personnel.14
“Unencumbered by a disciplinary identity,” service learning has flourished in
fields ranging from physical education to architecture, and can be found in some
form in every academic discipline (Schutz and Gere 179). The “decentralized
interest in service linked to higher education” appears in many places, such as in
the statements of commitment to community service now commonly found in
official university documents (Zlotkowski 22). Due to this broad distribution, a
wide range of activities constitute service learning practice, from community
advocacy projects to discipline-specific tutoring to internships with local
businesses. Depending on which scholar you read, there are anywhere from two
to a dozen different models of service learning. Such flexibility is one of service
learning’s strengths, and a vital aspect of its curricular durability. As Donald
Lazere has written, “No one size fits all in experiential learning; each situation
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calls for its own model based on its own teaching site, pool of students, and
community” (355).
Service learning has contributed to the commodification of knowledge in
our posthuman university system that increasingly emphasizes utility over the
traditional values of a liberal education. Additionally, the performance of service
is related to the creation and distribution of knowledge about the academy and its
inhabitants. Here, I won’t focus, as others have done, on the failure of servicelearning practitioners to help students discover “systemic explanation[s]” for
social ills and their tendency to see “social problems as chiefly or only personal”
(Herzberg, “Community” 309). While valid, such critiques ironically view this
problem as a personal failure of the teacher to take advantage of the critical
potential inherent in service-learning pedagogies. Rather, I want to question the
degree to which the larger discourse of service in the corporatized university
opposes the traditional goals of service learning (and thus the traditional
humanist foundation of service learning).
David Coogan has argued for greater attention to the material conditions
in which service learning occurs, and has written that “effective advocacy does
not begin with the principles of good argument, . . . but with an analysis of those
historical and material conditions that have made some arguments more viable
than others” (668). In a similar fashion, I intend to interrogate the material
conditions that have, for many teachers, made service learning approaches more
viable than other pedagogies in today’s academic climate, as well as in the global
climate where attitudes toward American institutions are at risk of being
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negatively impacted by international events. Such an approach draws attention to
how the institutional embrace of service learning in a knowledge economy is
based, not just on civic, cognitive, and moral justifications, but on economic and
political factors as well. The pressure placed on educators by the connectivity of
the classroom to both the local and global community to adopt pedagogies that
make use of these connections via service partnerships is one aspect of the
posthuman era. No longer can responsible educators manage classrooms and
students as if they are not already connected to the world beyond the classroom
walls. Service learning makes these connections explicit, although it may also
limit these connections in troubling ways.
Although in general I support (and have practiced) service-learning
pedagogies, and recognize the many potential personal and social benefits to
such activity, I also want to be critical of the ways in which the discourse
surrounding service learning can be co-opted by those seeking to solidify the
influence of market logic and corporate culture over educational institutions.
Critical assessment of how projects are chosen, implemented, and evaluated
must be a part of every service-learning program. Otherwise, as Robert Crooks
has written, service learning can become a “kind of voluntary band-aiding of
social problems that not only ignores the causes of problems but lets off the hook
those responsible for the problem” (Qtd. in Lazere 309). Hesitant to address root
social causes, service-learning practitioners may neglect opportunities for
“uniting knowledge-making and political action” in favor of less risky forms of
community engagement (Cushman, “Public” 328). In these ways, service
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learning unintentionally serves to legitimize the authority of market-savvy
institutions by providing them a way to signify their commitment to the public
good, while allowing them to avoid producing significant changes in the
communities they serve. Such a possibility is a disservice to the public good to
which service learning seeks to contribute.

Free Labor and the Production of Marketable Universities
“It is the vanity of educators that they shape the educational system to their
preferred image. They may not be without influence but the decisive force is the
economic system.”
–John Kenneth Galbraith (1967), The New Industrial State
When the passage above was published in 1967, in a book the author
himself considered his “principal effort in economic argument,” Galbraith was an
economist and public figure whose analyses following his defection from
neoclassical economic theories generated wide interest from those seeking to
balance the public good with private interests (xiii). Especially for
“institutionalists”—those economists who look to human-designed institutions as
primary shapers of economic and human activity—Galbraith’s writings provided a
welcome contrast to neoclassical theories that assumed that individuals act
rationally to maximize utility and companies naturally attempt to maximize profit.
Institutional economics promised instead to “discern in the variety of institutional
situations impinging upon individuals the chief source of differences in the
content of their behavior” (Hamilton 314, 318).15
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By decentering the control over the shape of educational institutions from
individual educators to economic forces, Galbraith contributed to a posthuman
understanding of the place of individuals within larger systems. But Galbraith was
unwilling to deny agency to individuals totally. His approach recognized that
“institutions are social arrangements capable of change rather than obstinate
natural phenomena” and, therefore, held out the possibility of agency even as it
emphasized the primary structural role of social institutions (Hamilton 318). In
many ways, this is a prescient view of the dialectical relationship between
humanism and posthumanism.
I believe this short review of institutional economic theory provides a
useful balance to the following discussion on the sway of market forces over
contemporary institutions of higher learning (and, in fact, helps to explain their
ascendancy). Some writers are indeed fond of reporting the commodification of
higher education as an unassailable “natural phenomena,” predicting that despite
faculty resistance, “market forces will have a stronger say” (Oblinger and Verville
156). But the nature of institutions of higher education, and of organizations in
general, as “social arrangements capable of change” provides hope that the
commercial relations that characterize the modern university can be refashioned
without abandoning the university’s need for economic survival, and without
abandoning ideals of intellectual and civic engagement. And I believe service
learning can be an important component of this renewal, but only if educators
understand the ways in which service activities within the university have already
been subsumed by the logic of the market.
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That the modern university’s participation in the knowledge economy is
economically driven is a given. As the editors of Capitalizing Knowledge have
stated plainly, the “transformation of the universities from institutions of cultural
preservation to institutions for the creation of new knowledge” is “due to external
pressures arising from constriction in government funding for academic research
accompanied by the growing awareness of the practical uses of academic
knowledge” (Etzkowitz et al. 1–2). 16 Critiques of the state of higher education in
the knowledge economy have not directly addressed the role of service learning,
however. Stanley Aronowitz’s The Knowledge Factory, for instance, made no
mention of the service-learning movement, although it does discuss at length
higher education’s reduction to the “training [of] young people for specialized
occupations for the corporate job markets” under the auspice of
“vocationalization” (17).
Although service learning helps fulfill the mission of the corporatized
university, it is uncommon for even fully praiseworthy assessments of the
corporatized university to mention service learning. In 2002, for instance, the
U.S. Southern Growth Policies Board published Innovation U.: New University
Roles in a Knowledge Economy, a collection of case studies documenting the
economic impact of U.S. universities that engaged in university-industry
partnerships. The authors of this text limited participation in the knowledge
economy to activities that contribute to “industrial innovation and performance”
through applied research, that provide vocational training to “human capital,” that
enable “technology transfer,” and that foster entrepreneurism (Tornatzky et al.
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16). But service learning made no appearance in any of their case studies (which
is possibly simply a discursive effect related to the conventional opposition of the
sciences and the humanities identified by Spanos). But it’s not as if service
learning could not have been incorporated into their model of the knowledge
economy. Service-learning projects could easily qualify as what they called
“extension activities”—activities in which academic expertise allows businesses
to make “optimal or novel use of existing knowledge” (Tornatzky et al. 17).
The lack of reference to “service learning” in Innovation U. is surprising
given that Stanford University is one of the twelve schools profiled in Innovation
U. Since the 1980s, Stanford has made service learning an integral part of its
educational and administrative structure, and is home to the highly visible Haas
Center for Public Service. The association of Stanford with excellence in service
learning is such that it is not uncommon to hear educators refer to the model of
service learning in which students write as their service to the community (by
producing documents for local organizations; as opposed to writing about their
service) as the “Stanford model for service-learning” (Bowdon and Scott 8). In the
same year Innovation U. was published, Stanford was even recognized by US
News and World Report as the number one university in the country for service
learning (Cho). Such oversights are admittedly common and ideologically
motivated. They are, however, poor indicators of the impact that service learning
has in the posthuman knowledge economy.
Aronowitz has argued that faculty in the new corporatized university do not
work primarily to advance their disciplines or to educate students, but to produce
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“useful knowledge, which can be measured by the amount of grant money,
commercial applications, or critical recognition they receive in appropriate circles
and which may enhance the institution’s prestige” (159). Faculty are, in short,
measured as machines in terms of their productivity. Aronowitz persuasively
traces how universities have succumbed to demands for the “vocationalization of
education” by “introducing vocational courses into the curriculum, and
encouraging internships—often coded as ‘experiential learning’—aimed at
inducing employers to hire their graduates” (127, 160).
It is possible that vocationalism—now commonly coded as “service
learning”—continues to justify the academy’s deference to market forces while
also contributing to the university’s ability to place graduates in jobs. It is one way
of claiming the humanistic high ground provided in the term “service,” while
yielding to the posthuman confluence between commercial and educational
interests. Having adopted the commercial model of an economy in which
knowledge “enables us to achieve measurable outcomes, such as a financial
profit . . . or a credential that has strong importance in the marketplace . . . the
academy has difficulty affirming the autonomy of knowledge apart from its market
value” (Gould 24).
This narrowed focus has led to the reduction in funding of, or the outright
cutting of, less marketable programs, often under the rubric of developing
“excellence” in limited areas. This “explicitly business discourse of excellence”
actually works to “shape institutions of higher education so that they will more
efficiently serve as conduits for meeting the needs of local, national, and
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transnational corporate interests” (Downing et al. 9). The shift toward developing
excellence, Bill Readings writes in The University in Ruins, is an empty marketing
strategy that attempts to “overcome the problem of the question of value across
disciplines, since excellence is [supposedly] the common denominator of good
research in all fields” (24). The lack of any fixed standard of judgment does not
deter the marketing of higher education, however. As Wesley Shumar wrote in
College for Sale: A Critique of the Commodification of Higher Education:
If [education] could be sold, a demand could be created for it. Consumers
could be found, or invented. This increased the image-producing—public
relations, advertising, market research, etc.—functions of the university
dramatically. College degrees, subject to market forces, started to be
managed in new ways. (83)
How universities market themselves, and the constituencies they court,
thus become significant forces in university curriculum and policy decisions.
Shumar noted that many of the traditional comprehensive liberal arts colleges
that survived the transition to the “instrumental logic of the marketplace” were
able to do so because they “developed a hotel management school, a physical
therapy program or some other form of practical education” that could be
marketed to the community (94). It is unsurprising that many modern universities
“produce new specialized degrees and certificates in order to make buyers desire
the product” (Shumar 83).
Such discourse openly acknowledges that education is a “product or
service; something to be sold to the public.” The alternative to embracing the new
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“entrepreneurial university” is to raise tuition, a choice few schools can afford to
make in the increasingly competitive environment of higher education. The
emergence of education as commodity also means a sharp increase in the role
of marketing in higher education. Just as market segmentation in consumer
goods led companies to produce “specialized products for smaller target
audiences in the hope of selling more goods,” higher education has had to
appeal to specific groups of students through targeted campaigns (Shumar 86).
In such a marketplace, schools must become savvy producers of
knowledge about themselves. As Powell and Snellman have pointed out,
“thousands of polytechnic schools worldwide . . . have changed their names to
universities. Such ‘upgrading’ is part of a movement to signal membership in a
knowledge economy” (216). It is possible that the adoption of service learning
pedagogies, especially for elite schools seeking the patronage of practicallyminded consumers but wary of associating themselves too strongly with
vocationalism, is yet another attempt to develop marketable excellence.

Service Learning in the Knowledge Economy
“I don't believe that questions about social structures, ideology,
and social justice are automatically raised by community service.
From my own experience, I am quite sure they are not.”
—Bruce Herzberg, “Community Service and Critical Teaching”
Although the purposes for implementing service learning are necessarily
diverse, in the most general sense, service-learning programs offer a way to
satisfy concurrently the public’s desire for the practical application of academic
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knowledge, the student’s desire for professional experience, the university’s
desire for community outreach, and the faculty’s desire for social justice and
professional distinction. In a less admirable manner, it can also provide students
with a type of flattering self-knowledge, exploiting service to the other as a source
of “life-changing” moments and “spiritual renewal” (Albert 186; hooks 183). Such
moments of personal renewal might be seen as an individualized response to the
crisis in humanism. In other words, to combat the sense of decenteredness
attendant to posthumanism, students are being offered the chance to connect at
a personal level with other human beings, addressing systemic problems at the
level of the individual.
Academics as well may be guilty of embracing service learning as a
flexible commodity in the knowledge economy—an efficient means to satisfy all
three traditional areas of academic evaluation (teaching, research, and service).
Multi-tasking academics can deploy service-learning pedagogies in the
classroom, present scholarship on service-learning topics in specialized journals
and at conferences, and make good on their personal and professional
commitments to community engagement, all the while outsourcing the majority of
the service to their students and enjoying the “countercultural” reputation still
associated with experiential education (Morton 279).
Ideally, service learning allows “various knowledges [to] be brought to
bear in problem-solving activities without the privileging of academic knowledge
above the others” (Cushman, “New” 211). But the privileging of academic
knowledge seems a mild threat in today’s corporatized university. More likely, the
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knowledges engaged will be limited to those that “make money, study money, or
attract money” (Press and Washburn 52). Part of the ease with which service
learning can be co-opted by market values lies in the similarity between the
discourse of advocates of service learning and those of the corporatized
university. In What Business Wants from Higher Education, Diana Oblinger and
Anne-Lee Verville reported that business leaders want flexible workers with
stronger communication skills, the ability to work in teams, an understanding of
globalization and its implications, the ability to work with people of diverse
backgrounds, and adequate ethics training (22).
These correlate well with the stated objectives of many service–learning
advocates (especially the latter two qualities above—multiculturalism and moral
education), and with the common practices of service-learning classrooms, which
are almost uniformly collaborative. Oblinger and Verville also stress the need of
businesses for a pool of potential employees with “practical experience” (90). In
fact, the authors explicitly called for pedagogies that provide “real-world
exposure” through “internship[s] or cooperative experience[s]” that connect
students to the culture of their future employers (92). Such appeals sound similar
to those made by academics who promote service learning by claiming that
“practical experience enhances learning” (Zlotkowski 24). Even the insistence
among scholars for service learning to “address social issues important to
community members” is not that far removed from the corporate “obsession” in
“delivering what is of value to the client, not necessarily what is of value to the
producer” (Cushman, “Public” 329; Oblinger and Verville 77).
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In order to survive in the competitive market for products and services,
modern corporations have adopted several strategies that reduce costs and
maintain a flexible workforce, including downsizing, outsourcing, economies of
scale, and strategic alliances with other businesses. But the strategy most
important to understanding the role of service in the posthuman knowledge
economy is the acquisition of beneficial externalities. Externalities are, put
simply, the “effect of a business transaction that benefits or hurts persons other
than those who directly take part in the transaction” (Baumol and Blinder 269).
Beneficial externalities are, in the crassest sense, external conditions that
improve a company’s profit margin in a business transaction. Subsidies and other
economic incentives that reduce the cost of doing business would qualify, as
would less legitimate ways of avoiding the true cost of delivering a product or
service (such as avoiding the cost of disposing of hazardous waste by dumping it
illegally). By getting external entities to absorb the material costs of bringing a
product to market, corporations can maintain market share and remain
competitive without changing other aspects of their business model.
The ability of corporations to outsource their research and training needs
to university faculty is a beneficial externality that increases the profit available
through transactions with actual customers. More importantly, profit can be
generated in a knowledge economy through the commercialization of intellectual
property rights made available to corporations through industry-university
research partnerships (Tornatzky et al. 17). And it is not only corporations who
recognize the value of externalities. This fact was brought to my attention quite
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vividly when, after contacting a local non-profit in hopes of arranging a servicelearning project, I discovered that my email had been forwarded with this altered
subject line: “Opportunity for FREE LABOR!”. In everyday language, a beneficial
externality is “simply a good deed for which the doer of the deed is not paid, or
not paid adequately, for the benefit he or she produces” (Baumol and Blinder
270). In other words, it is service.
One might point out that students engaged in service learning do benefit
from their association with the organizations they work with, primarily in the form
of knowledge and experience gained. But such knowledge exchanges are just
another example of how corporate models of reciprocity mirror the ideals of
academia and community found in service-learning pedagogies. Lost in such
exchanges is what Michael Bérubé has called the “very ideal of independent
intellectual inquiry, the kind of inquiry whose outcomes cannot be known in
advance and cannot be measured in terms of efficiency or productivity” (21). It is
questionable whether service-learning pedagogies that emphasize the pragmatic
benefits accruing to organizations and individuals in knowledge exchanges can
truly prepare students to achieve what the Association of American Colleges and
Universities has identified as the goal of a liberal education: “to live responsible,
productive, and creative lives in a dramatically changing world” (“About AACU”).
It is, of course, possible that service-learning opportunities can be
structured that do not merely cede educational goals to professional goals. The
inclusion of critical reflection as a necessary part of any service-learning
experience, for instance, can draw attention to larger social issues by de124

naturalizing the inequalities and ideologies that students encounter. Without such
reflection, Bruce Herzberg has written, “students will not critically question a
world that seems natural, inevitable, given; instead, they will strategize about
their position within it” (“Community” 317). But the posthuman emphasis on one’s
position in a network of humanity may move students to continually assess their
education, not in terms of an abstract rubric of intellectual value, but in terms of
the positions and connections made available to them through their schoolwork.
Besides producing knowledge desired by the community, service learning
also produces knowledge about the university (about it being a good community
member, for instance) that can be used to gain advantage in a competitive
marketplace. Outreach efforts are not unique to universities, of course. Through
its Space Alliance Technology Outreach Program (SATOP), NASA provides to
small businesses engineers who will attempt to apply their engineering expertise
to solve problems impeding the business’ financial success. Though provided
free of charge, these efforts are not merely philanthropic. As one reporter
commented: “For all its altruism, the 12-year-old SATOP also serves as a public
relations campaign, demonstrating to the public that NASA has worthy effects
outside the confines of space exploration” (Rexrode).
The present traction of the corporate social responsibility (CSR)
movement, where corporations are expected to give back to their communities,
and the increasing popularity of fair-trade and socially responsible goods,
suggest that commitment to the public good, and the humanism that serves as
the foundation of this public good, is itself a marketable commodity in the
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knowledge economy. Some analysts even consider CSR a form of “global brand
insurance” which provides a “competitive strategy because [brands] serve as
profit platforms that differentiate even commodity-like products and services”
(Werther and Chandler 317). As institutions of higher learning continue to reach
out to global markets, such protection of the “intangible and vulnerable” capital
embodied in their university brands will become increasingly valuable (Werther
and Chandler 321). Not only do service learners participate in the knowledge
economy by providing expertise to the local community and by producing new
knowledge for private, governmental, and corporate entities, service learning also
extends university brands within the global education marketplace.

Ranking Service: Serving Rankings
“No one can mistake what the modern university stands for: service to society.”
—Eric Gould, The University in a Corporate Culture
College rankings such as those produced by US News and World Report
and The Washington Monthly are highly contested markers of higher education’s
entrenchment within the knowledge economy. These rankings have received
heavy criticism, both from academic and popular sources critical of the formulas
used to determine placement, as well as from university administrators who,
aware that the “flow of tuition dollars is affected by popular rankings,” feel
pressured to “behave in ways that, collectively, may damage” all institutions of
higher education (Goldin B24; Qtd. in Engell and Dangerfield 35). Although
originating in meritocratic intentions to “mitigate or even to negate the power of
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wealth and privilege,” rankings have become a “controversial but nonetheless
authoritative” system that threatens to draw resources away from the core
missions of educational institutions (Engell and Dangerfield 34; Goldin B24).
Even though rankings are considered only one of the indicators of school
quality, their impact is powerful because they are, unfortunately, “becoming the
only indicators in popular circulation” (Engell and Dangerfield 35). So, while
corporations and other community organizations have become dependent upon
universities for knowledge services necessary to stay competitive in the global
market, universities concerned with maintaining their “brand” have become
beholden to the knowledge circulated about them by the ranking industry and to
the market logics that guide such systems.
What types of engagement, one might ask, do such classifications
recognize and encourage? In an article for the Chronicle of Higher Education,
Rebecca Goldin critiqued rankings by the Washington Monthly. She noted that
one-third of the Washington Monthly score is based on “community service,” and
that this third is composed of three measures: “the percentage of students in
Army or Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC); the percentage of alumni
currently serving in the Peace Corps; and the percentage of those students on
Federal Work-Study doing community projects” (Goldin B24). Observing that
schools will attempt to increase their rankings because the “flow of tuition dollars
is affected by popular rankings,” she asked a logical question: “To raise their
rankings, will universities encourage ROTC participation?” The models of service
and the ideal of the public good that rankings promote are thus severely limited.
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Ultimately, it is within the classification systems themselves that
educational value is created. Oblinger and Verville have explained the nature of
quality in the modern market thusly:
First, quality is perceived. It is based on the customer’s judgment, not
one’s own. Second, the quality of the product is important, but most
competitive situations will be won or lost on the quality of the services that
are associated with the product rather than the product itself. Third, quality
is relative, not absolute. (13)
Thus, rankings and classifications that compare institutions establish a hierarchy
devoid of any substantive measure of quality. This is a particularly posthuman
problem of circularity in which the circuit of measurement has no external
referent. Haraway notes that posthumanism is about simulation rather than
representation. Representation always points to some prior object, and its
measure is traditionally the faithfulness of the representation to the original. But
in simulation it is more important to be internally consistent. The establishment of
educational value in posthuman culture thus makes use of rankings to initiate a
feedback loop that restricts the ability of institutions to establish value outside of
the network created by rankings.
Although service learning has been a part of rankings before, it might be
considered troubling, based on the overall impact of rankings, that a separate
community engagement classification now exists. In 2006, 76 U.S. colleges and
universities were selected by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching for its new community engagement classification. This is an “elective”
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classification not based on national data, like other rankings, but on
documentation submitted by each school that describes its engagement, broadly
conceived, with the community. The Carnegie Foundation described its effort
spiritedly as “an exciting move in Carnegie's work to extend and refine the
classification of colleges and universities . . . It represents a significant affirmation
of the importance of community engagement in the agenda of higher education”
(“Carnegie”). I submit, however, that such an affirmation is another capitulation to
market forces and represents universities’ need to differentiate themselves in a
higher education market in which the content and quality of the curriculum takes
a backseat to relative comparisons associated with economic measures. By
reducing the diversity of school curricula and disciplinary strengths to “strictly
numerical evaluations,” these judgments about academic quality trivialize the
work of educators, and, quite often, represent little more than the size of a
university’s endowment (Etzkowitz et al. 34).
Service can be considered a marketing effort that proves the utility of a
college degree by supplying the community with practical benefits provided by
degree-earners. Administrators are increasingly pressured to sell both their own
school and the very idea of higher education. As Eric Gould observes: “The
[modern] mission statement is like an advertisement” (5). But such
advertisements do not necessarily represent the priorities of administrators or
faculty. Although service is quite visibly included in higher education mission
statements, the “importance of service is seldom as evident in their work as are
teaching and research” (Bringle and Hatcher 273). As the University of South
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Florida has admitted, their community engagement activities are “integral to
providing students with work experience and establishing a positive presence in
the community, which in turn can attract future students” (Booth).
On their own, commitments to service in the agendas of institutions of
higher education, as visible in their mission statements, have little power to
attract or repel students. As Gould has argued, “[s]tudents do not choose
colleges by comparing mission statements because there is little to differentiate
between the various philosophies they contain” (4). But if mission statements,
and the commitments to service that they contain, are themselves poor means of
differentiation in the academic market, the commercial value of service must be
constructed elsewhere. As suggested above, the ability of local community
service to attract future students establishes its commercial value. But this only
works for local consumers. In order for service to influence the global clientele of
posthuman universities, one needs initiatives like the Carnegie Foundation’s
Community Engagement Classification.
Unfortunately, such rankings do not ask hard questions about the nature
of the community engagement in which the university participates, or about the
effects of economic partnerships on the educational experiences of students.
They are committed to measuring the “quality of the services that are associated
with the product rather than the product itself” (Oblinger and Verville 13). This
can be seen in the broad definition of what counts as community engagement in
such classifications. The press release from USF that announced their newly
bestowed Carnegie classification gave as an example of its community
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engagement the “launch of a multimillion partnership with Silicon Valley research
and technology giant SRI International, and [receipt of] $8 million to build a
Florida Center of Excellence in biotechnology” (Booth). Here, a traditional
industry-university partnership of the entrepreneurial variety focused on
developing excellence in a business-friendly discipline is recast as a form of
community service.
As Raymond Williams wrote, community is a “warmly persuasive word”
that “never seems to be used unfavourably, and never to be given any positive
opposing or distinguishing term” (76, 66). It appears that service may have
attained this status as well. Visitors to the University of South Florida Tampa
campus in spring, 2007, encountered two signs posted repeatedly across
campus. The first sign stated “USF Breaks All Records: $310,000,000 Research
Awards”; the other stated “Carnegie Foundation Selects USF for Community
Engagement Classification.” Considering the broad definition of what is counted
as community engagement, it’s not clear that these signs say anything
substantially different.

Re-establishing the Posthuman Value of Service
“It is time all reading and writing teachers situate their activities within the
contexts of the larger profession as well as the contexts of economic and political
concerns. We have much to gain working together and much to lose working
alone.”
–James Berlin, Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures
For English teachers, the term service is especially provocative. Gary
Olson notes in the preface to his edited collection, Rhetoric and Composition as
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Intellectual Work, that the teaching of writing has historically been considered a
“service discipline” with no research agenda or tradition of intellectual inquiry of
its own (xii). Because the historic division of U.S. English departments into
tenured literature professors and untenured (nowadays, mostly adjunct) writing
teachers was a partial consequence of the financial difficulty of staffing small
classes of student writers with well-paid professors, resistance to being a service
discipline is, in a larger sense, resistance to being compelled by economic
forces. It is a retreat to the humanism of individual choice and self-determination.
But Berlin’s statement above regarding reading and writing teachers is true for all
educators attempting to work in the presence of market forces that sanction
higher education’s role as a credentialing and research service under the
auspices of community engagement. By viewing higher education within its
political and economic contexts, we can begin to understand the ways in which
posthuman educators “are always already implicated in service relationships with
extra-disciplinary constituencies” (Mahala and Swilky 627).
In response to Williams’ statement mentioned earlier that community is
never given a “positive opposing or distinguishing term,” Joseph Harris has
suggested that there is such a word: public. Whereas community is most often
used to identify a group of people (a marketing segment, if you will), Harris has
argued that public refers to a “kind of space and process, a point of contact that
needs both to be created and continuously maintained” (109). Such a distinction
draws attention to both the necessarily political nature of community
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engagement, and the need to continuously reform the institutions that govern our
social interactions to better support our visions of responsible citizenship.
One small step in bringing our institutions into closer accord with the
ideals of the public good is to make such work visible within the university
system. In its application for the Carnegie Foundation’s Community Engagement
Classification, USF admitted that its policies for promotion and tenure do not
explicitly acknowledge university-community engagement activities, research,
and scholarship (“Application” 19). Without such internal support, the servicelearning movement risks becoming beholden to those types of service valued by
market forces and corporate sponsors, and risks losing “many of its best
practitioners through the failure of the academy as a whole to recognize and
reward their work” (Zlotkowski 24).
The broad interest in service learning is, and always will be, part of the
economic structure of higher education. In his foreword to Moving Beyond
Academic Discourse—Christian Weisser’s book on composition studies and the
public sphere—Gary Olson reports that a chief acquisitions editor of a major
textbook publisher visited him, as well as several other senior faculty in the field
of rhetoric and composition, to determine “where the field was heading,” in hopes
of anticipating the next big thing (“Foreword” ix). In response, Olson mentioned a
few promising areas to the editor, but
. . . saved until last the area that that I thought would most likely lead us all
into the new decade: public writing, especially as it is linked to service
learning. [The editor’s] eyes immediately lit up (I could almost see the
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dollar signs shining in his pupils), and he commented excitedly, “This is
incredible. Practically everyone that I’ve consulted has said the exact
same thing.” (“Foreword” ix)
The challenge for service-learning advocates in today’s institutions of higher
learning is to establish the value of service learning without reverting to economic
calculation of its value merely as a boon to a student’s ability to obtain
employment, as a beneficial externality to local organizations, or as a promising
market niche for textbook publishers. The challenge is also to not retreat from the
networked social ecologies of modern universities into an introverted humanistic
rationale for service.
As Peter Mortensen has written, educators “must go public” because of
the ethical obligations we hold to the “publics we serve” (150). In his article
“Service Learning and Public Discourse,” Bruce Herzberg says we can satisfy
these ethical obligations by using service learning to bridge the “gap between
academic investigation, on the one hand, and public discourse and public policy,
on the other” (395). At the 1996 convention of CCCC (Conference on College
Composition and Communication) Lester Faigley, in his Chair’s address, called
for academics in English programs to “engage in public discourse” in order to “to
stop the decline in publicly supported education,” and such calls have been oft
repeated (41).
Heeding this call, Herzberg asks his students to draw on conversations in
the academic, popular, and public spheres in order to “examine and practice
public discourse forms but also to figure out how to bring their academic
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knowledge to bear in public argument” (“Public” 399). Rather than assume that
academic knowledge can easily transfer to public policy issues, Herzberg’s
students question the very possibility of engaging in public policy issues from the
academy, recognizing that, more often than not, “public policy follows popular,
not academic, opinion” (“Public” 395).
Those of us interested in service learning are well-positioned to engage
the public, not only as supplicants seeking support for our own agendas, but as
collaborators who can engage the public in the maintenance of a democratic
polis. One of the risks of academics engaging the public is exactly that one’s
message becomes subject to discourses beyond the scope of one’s disciplinary
interests. In the case of service learning, the dominant discourse which
educators must address is one which limits the value of knowledge to its
application towards practical and commercial ends, which embraces
questionable rankings systems, and which valorizes service as a way of
generating market-oriented knowledge about universities, teachers, and
students. When we engage the public, however, we may find that market forces,
measured against the vitality of posthuman university-community partnerships
dedicated to the public good, are not the unassailable formations they presume
to be.
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Chapter 5
Posthuman (In)Conclusions
“The only responsible intellectual is one who is wired.”
--Mark C. Taylor and Esa Saarinen, Imagologies
Current scholarship provides us with an understanding of posthumanism
that is at once both functional for understanding our relationship to the
increasingly technologically mediated world around us, and theoretical in
understanding the human psyche’s attachment to the excesses of humanism. It
is born of the personal, professional, and cultural networks taking shape in the
posthuman age. In the most superficial sense, posthumanism will always be
seen as the blending of human and machine, where individuals incorporate into
their selves the technological tools previously considered separate from the
physical body. But it is much more than this. It is the slow and continual
recognition of a new kind of identity, a new type of community, and a new type of
relationship with the material world and others in it. Posthumanist views of the
relationship between subjects is not an either/or choice (human or machine, man
or woman, image or text, play or work), but a both/and proposition which
generates hybrids (or, in the traditional humanist view, monstrosities).
In order to analyze the possibility of educational practices more
responsive to posthumanism, this dissertation has interrogated the continuing
importance of the body as the site of emergence of the posthuman, as well as
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considered how the posthuman is implicated in two emerging phenomena: the
increasing presence of video games in education and the widespread adoption of
service-learning pedagogies. Video games are commonly associated with the
posthuman, as they comprise complex virtual spaces in which players adopt
virtual personas, form online communities, and build fictional worlds. But service
learning, which is generally placed in the humanist tradition, is just as much a
response to, and embrasure of, posthumanism. In the end, they are both identity
machines, prostheses that allow us to extend our sense of self in productive
ways, establishing networks and feedback loops that allow us to construct who
we are in the world in relation to other beings. They are both technologies of the
self in the Foucauldian tradition, technologies that reveal the constructedness of
the self even as they naturalize the individual subjectivities that emerge form
them.
The roles of video games and service learning are important for scholars
to consider as they investigate the continuing role of posthumanism in the
academy. Revealingly, both situate the student outside of the traditional
university classroom, emphasizing that connectivity with others is a key to
learning. One danger of such an emphasis is that students will come to see the
outside world as merely a tool to further their own personal agendas. Much like
the self-reinforcing practices of ego psychology, service learning can leave intact
traditional notions of the self (and, thus, the ideologies that sustain them), and
may even leave them stronger than before. This possibility has been much
analyzed in the case of service-learning, whose critics have often questioned the
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ability of individual service projects to give students a broad understanding of
social structures, of the confluence of power and knowledge, and of the
materiality that makes problems social rather than merely personal. In the case
of gaming, most of the academic focus has been on games that employ the firstperson perspective, where one gamer assumes the identity of a single player and
plays alone, essentially separate from other gamers. Scholars might turn their
attention to games where players do not assume a single or singular identity and
in the future, focus on the social aspects of successful participation in gaming
that take place off-screen, such as participation in guilds. Ideally, a responsible
posthumanism can improve the educational value of both pedagogical areas
while engendering a deeper understanding of the political in student lives.

Political Posthumanism
“What could be the politics of whatever singularity, that is, of a being
whose community is mediated not by any condition of belonging (being
red, being Italian, being Communist) nor by the simple absence of
conditions . . . , but by belonging itself?”
– Giorgio Agamben, “The Coming Community”
Politics calls on us to build a world in which the one and the many can
coexist. But even the notion of constructing a world in relation to other beings
may carry too much humanist weight for some. As Ann Weinstone writes, such
statements may not move far enough away from the “logic of elite ownership:
ownership of knowledge, land, material and psychic resources, and sociopolitical
entitlements” that sustains humanism (25). “Even concepts such as consensus
and intersubjectivity,” she writes, are “based on ownership.” In order to break
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from this notion of relationships with others as the ownership of resources to
expand individual subjects, posthumanism needs to continue to develop, as
Hardt and Negri have noted, an understanding of the things owned in “common
that allows [people] to communicate and act together” (xv).
The most common misconception about posthumanism is that it is against
either humans or humanism. Despite these straw man arguments, post-human
does not mean anti-human. Proponents of posthumanism do not necessarily
reject the autonomy of the human subject; rather, they acknowledge the multiple
subjectivities within that autonomy. It is the classic problem of the political
coexistence of the one and the many that scholars from Aristotle to Hegel to
Deleuze and Guattari to Hardt and Negri have addressed. This has always been
a concern of those who would identify as humanists and it continues to be a
concern of posthumanists. As Mark Taylor and Esa Saarinen write in
Imagologies,
The fundamental philosophical problem in the West is the problem of the
one and the many. From its beginnings in ancient Greece, western
philosophy has identified being with oneness or unity and non-being with
manyness or plurality. To be is to be one. . . . One of the most significant
marks of the advent of modernity and its extension in postmodernity is a
reversal of the relative value attributed to the one and the many. In
contemporary culture, oneness and unity are regarded as non-being, while
manyness and plurality are believed to characterize being.” (“Shift” 2)
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The many offshoots of posthumanism attempt to place multiplicity at the core of
this new mode of being, to allow for a whatever being that does not require a
stable core of selfhood, and which can find identity in the unstable, flickering
world of digital signifiers. It is within this instability that we might see the
posthuman project as part of the postmodern project, and it is this instability that
poses a similar challenge to each. The challenge is to not let this lack of unity
translate into immobility; in order to continue the posthumanist project, we “must
prevent the absence of destination from creating a sense of purposelessness”
(Taylor and Saarinen, Imagologies “Net” 12). This working through of
ambivalence should be part of any definition of critical technological literacy
applicable to the posthuman era.
Admittedly, posthumanists are sometimes prone to utopian views of the
possibility of a social revolution, to a coming community built on the ability of
communication technologies to hasten a “democracy on a global scale” that
brings together “radical differences, singularities, that can never be synthesized
in an identity” (Hardt and Negri xi, 355). Posthumanists “want to prevent violence
by undermining notions of a superior, self-willing, self-possessed person and its
march toward ontological and epistemological transcendence” (Weinstone 4). But
the current war in the Middle East bolstered by the quest to bring democracy to
the world should give pause to those who think that an increasingly connected
world will automatically result in fewer conflicts, greater understanding, and social
justice.
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As Baudrillard warns in “Prophylaxis and Virulence,” all “integrated and
hyperintegrated systems . . . tend towards the extreme constituted by
immunodeficiency. Seeking to eliminate all external aggression, they secrete
their own internal virulence . . . and thus tend to self destruct” (35). The more
we’re connected, the more likely that a single breakdown in one area will affect
all the others. While this connectivity means that one action in a network (or a
series of connected networks in an integrated system) may have an effect on any
or all of it’s component parts, the network itself often attempts to compensate to
avoid collapse. Witness the 2008 breakdown in the sub-prime mortgage arena.
When the investment lender Bear Stearns seemed to be in financial trouble due
to overinvestment in risky sub-prime mortgages that lost their value due to a drop
in home values, the U.S. government stepped in to protect the economy.
According to the Christian Science Monitor, the U.S. government “saved Bear
Stearns from bankruptcy because a collapse of the investment bank would have
reverberated throughout the economy – increasing the risk of lower incomes,
lower home values, and unemployment for ordinary Americans” (Grier 1). Now,
legislators are struggling to find ways to ensure that the “weaknesses of a single
firm does not again threaten the whole economy” (Grier 1). But the very
mechanism through which such companies gain access to global financial
markets and flows of international capital are the same ones that expose them to
the threat of systemic collapse. One cannot be plugged in and unplugged at the
same time.
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The realization that the interconnectedness of the modern world exposes
us to increased risk would come as a shock to those who originally designed the
most important network today: the internet. In 1964, when Paul Baran first
considered possible structures for what would eventually become the internet, he
rejected the idea of a centralized network in which all users connected to one
central node. According to Baran, such a design would not be “redundant
enough” and would thus be vulnerable because communication could easily be
severed by the destruction of a single node (quoted in Barabási 144). Rather, he
advocated a distributed network where “even if some nodes went down,
alternative paths maintained the connection between the rest of the nodes"
(quoted in Barabási 144). Although his ideas were initially resisted by industry
and military leaders, they became the foundation for the internet’s current
distributed structure.
The crises to which modern networks are susceptible are not restricted to
economic structures, but to cultural ones as well, including 21st century outbreaks
of war and genocide. If posthumanists want to prevent such crises, they need to
assess whether such events truly depend on the concepts of self that are the
target of much posthumanist criticism, and consider the possibility of emergent
posthuman justifications for violent and unjust actions. Relieved of the typical
human range of bodily experience and situated instead within the more
numerous yet seemingly less substantial virtual relations among posthumans, it
is possible that we become more vulnerable to the politics of fear and anxiety. As
Baudrillard warns, it is only in the “hyperprotected space [that] the body loses all
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its defences” (35). Posthuman criticism of the subject may be too concerned with
the humanist question of “Who is the subject?” and not concerned enough with
the posthumanist question of “How is the subject?,” a question that would move
us from questions of having to questions of being and doing.
We must be wary of narratives that claim to be progressive by inverting
hierarchies rather than translating them. For instance, John Carpenter's 2001
science fiction film, Ghosts of Mars, focuses on the operation of a small military
unit under the command of a female officer on the planet Mars. In the movie, the
planet Mars is presented as being a matriarchy in which the government and its
RSAs ("repressive state apparatuses," a la Althusser) are run by women. While
this might seem initially to be a progressive premise, what occurs is a reversal of
the sexes of the subjects without a change in hierarchical gender narratives. The
men represent women and the women represent men, changing the positionality
within the structure of gender relations, but without a significant change in the
structure itself. In this case, the technology of gender continues unabated, and
women are its fictional beneficiaries.
In this film, women engage in a complete range of swearing, fighting, and
other forms of physical and verbal assault. Men are subservient and referred to
as "breeders" since their primary value is as possible mates for the women in
charge. The main difference is that the men incessantly offer sexual favors to
their bosses without intimidation or coercion. Seemingly, sexual harassment
complaints are unlikely since sexual relations are being initiated by those not in
positions of power. The Ghosts of Mars represents a male fantasy in which
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subordinates actively pursue sexual relations with figures of authority and in
which these authorities, instead of being implicated in sexual coercion, are free to
choose from among their subordinates for their sexual partners. Ghosts of Mars
does not represent an alternate social order, but our present one infused with
pornographic sensibilities. If we are not careful, the same type of inversion can
occur with the human/machine binary, resulting in a hyper-celebration of the
cyborg.
In our attempts to supplant the humanist framework in place in society, it
is important to realize that, as Thomas Foster has written, “posthumanism is as
likely to serve conservative agendas as progressive ones” (xii). The weakening of
the inclusive narratives of humanism may actually make it harder for groups to
identify with each other. And it seems possible that corporate interests have
taken advantage of the posthuman era to turn classrooms into machinic factories
for commercial knowledge and exploitable labor. In Democracy Matters, Cornel
West claims that contemporary imperialism is composed of three related
“antidemocratic dogmas”: free-market fundamentalism, aggressive militarism,
and escalating authoritarianism (3). Technology enables the acolytes of these
dogmas as much as it enables those who question them; both rely on the
communicative, economic, and cultural networks of meaning transmitted through
ideological systems. Whether posthuman educators embrace these doctrines or
challenge them remains to be seen.
The opportunity to produce citizens who are critically technologically
literate is perhaps the greatest promise of posthuman education, an act capable
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of releasing the “liberatory, ethicopolitical potentials” of posthumanism
(Weinstone 20). Understanding the range of possible social structures and forms
of relation as technologies which can be adopted in order to produce different
modes of being is a useful practice. But understanding that such adoption is not
always a matter of individual choice is a sobering observation that should temper
our embrace of the more utopian views of a posthuman future. As our machinic
consciousnesses overlap and approach indivisibility with other machines,
posthumans will hopefully find themselves increasingly unable and unwilling to
sink into enclaves of virtual community disconnected from the larger social world.
The broad implications for such separatism are already visible in the
ongoing state of international conflict and the various neuroses of capitalism.
Rethinking our relation to our political systems, to our environment, to our
economies, to our technologies, to our work, to our leisure, and to other whatever
beings is an unfinished, and ultimately unfinishable, project. The coming
community is posthuman, but it may not be posthuman enough.
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Notes
1. Digital images of these two magazine covers are available online through
Time.com:
http://www.time.com/time/personoftheyear/archive/covers/1982.html and
http://www.time.com/time/personoftheyear/archive/covers/2007.html
2. Games have always called upon players to be and to do. The title of this
chapter is a reference to a popular series of games from the Sierra Online
company called the “Quest for Glory” series, the first of which was titled “So You
Want to Be a Hero” (emphasis added). This chapter focuses on the doing that
accompanies these virtual modes of being.
3. The terms “video game enthusiasts” and “teachers” conceal as much as they
reveal. The forum consisted of Jane Avrich, an author and English teacher;
Steven Johnson, an author and Distinguished Writer in Residence at NYU’s
Department of Journalism; Raph Koster, author and video game designer who
led the design of MMORPGs such as Star Wars Galaxies and Ultima Online; and
Thomas De Zengotita, a teacher and contributing editor of Harper’s Magazine.
From the descriptions given at the start of the article, it’s unclear which two of the
last three individuals comprise the “video game enthusiasts.” The forum was
moderated by Bill Wasik, a senior editor of Harper’s Magazine.
4. Gamers and game designers are related but separate communities of practice,
and therefore the genres that each value and the conventions they follow will
differ. In this chapter, I focus on the genres that gamers produce. It should be
noted, however, that the documents produced by game designers represent
another promising site of inquiry into the relationship between video games and
technical writing. The most significant document to be looked at is likely the
series of game “bibles” that developers use to organize and formalize ideas
regarding characters, settings, quests, and other elements of the game world
they are creating. The ongoing revision of the persistent virtual worlds of
MMORPGs represents a significant challenge that such documents help
manage.
5. As gamers have taken greater roles as producers of game content, as games
have given players greater control over their avatars, and as gamers have
participated in more game-related activities outside of the bounds of the game
itself, the intellectual property statements built into end user license agreements
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have drawn increased scrutiny, especially due to their uneven enforcement. For
an introduction to the tensions between corporate and individual property rights
over game content, see T. L. Taylor’s “Whose Game Is This Anyway?” and Raph
Koster’s “Declaring the Rights of Players.”
6. The role of narrative in online games is heightened by the fact that gamers,
especially when playing as members of a guild or other persistent social group,
often use Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) systems that are separate from the
gaming software to communicate with other players. A 2006 survey of World of
Warcraft players who were members of guilds found that “Roughly 70% of the
interviewees said they chatted regularly with their guild mates about topics
ranging from game strategy to real-life personal issues” (Williams et al. 351).
Such work does not even begin to calculate the amount of story-telling that likely
goes on outside the game as well.
7. Games often use technical texts as in-game plot elements. For instance, the
Ultima series, the longest-running computer role-playing game franchise, has as
a recurring plot element a book known as the “Codex of Ultimate Wisdom,” which
is a book containing all knowledge about the fictional game world—a
comprehensive help file, if you will. It is no surprise to find, then, that a gamer
has created a web site that collects technical information regarding the Ultima
series of games, and called his site “The Other Codex.”
8. The PTA web site is no longer available online, as the guild has disbanded,
but portions of the site can still be accessed through the Internet Archive
Wayback Machine at
http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.povartarewalliance.org/. The title of this
web site, Povar-Tarew Alliance, is just one interpretation of the PTA acronym,
which began as the Povarian Trades Association. When the Povar server on
which the guild operated merged with another server named Tarew Marr to form
the Xev server, the PTA changed the meaning of its acronym to Povar-Tarew
Artisans in order to attract artisans from the discontinued Tarew server (later,
when the focus of the group shifted away from crafting trade items, the acronym
was re-interpreted as the Povar-Tarew Alliance). The PTA was active between
1999 and March of 2005, a reasonably long life when one considers that 21% of
guilds present at any given time on similar servers disappear after only one
month (Williams et al. 349).
9. Interestingly, one of the examples that Miller offers of a typical situation to
which an individual might respond in a generic fashion is of “players instructing
novice in a game” (157).
10. The instances of cross-over between games and “real life” are too abundant
to address here. In-game marriages, face-to-face player conferences, hyperrepresentational avatars, the emergence of professional gaming, and the
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existence of gaming-based services such as Internet Gaming Entertainment,
where virtual currency, items, and whole accounts can be bought, represent just
a few of the ways that games exceed the virtual worlds from which they emerge,
and players engage in out-of-game activities through which acceptable game
play is defined.
11. Gamers who seek employment as beta testers of video games may be
considering the gaming industry as a career choice, or they may simply be
seeking the cultural capital that comes with having advanced knowledge of new
games. Either way, they can become involved with industry-level technical
communities at a young age. Online sites such as www.gamestester.com have
even emerged to help “all those interested in playing games for a living” find jobs
as beta testers.
12. In EQ, although death is not permanent, players risk the loss of experience
levels and abilities when they die in the game, as well as the functionality
embodied in any of the equipment they were carrying at the time. If they do not
retrieve their bodies within a set time limit, their bodies disappear from the game,
and the items they are carrying are lost.
13. The DigiPen Institute of Technology also offers degrees with more traditional
names such as Bachelor’s degrees in computer science, computer engineering
and production animation.
14. The research related to service-learning is extensive and can be found within
the traditional publications of many disciplines, as well as specialized journals
such as the Michigan Journal of Community Service Learning and the Journal of
Higher Education Outreach and Engagement. Good online sites to visit in order
to gain an appreciation of the scope of the institutional support behind service
learning would be the National Service Learning Clearinghouse at
http://www.servicelearning.org/, and Campus Compact at
http://www.compact.org/. Many states also have their own Campus Compact
initiatives.
15. Institutional economics was named so by Walton Hamilton in 1919 in “The
Institutional Approach to Economic Theory.” This built on previous work by
Thorstein Veblen and John Commons on the role of collective action in
economics. It is commonly called the old institutional economics, as opposed to
the new institutional economics associated with later scholars such as Ronald
Coase, Douglass North, Oliver Williamson, and Claude Ménard.
16. The link between service learning and the practical application of knowledge
runs deep. The image accompanying Edward Zlotkowski’s 1996 article titled
“Linking Service-Learning and the Academy” depicts five individuals in
professional attire using saws, hammers, and boards to build an addition to a
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school building. This associates service, even in reference to the academy, with
practical needs and vocations (shelter and construction, respectively) (21).
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